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 1 
Summary 
In Action 13 of the OECD/G20 Base erosion and profit shifting project, the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) re-
examines transfer pricing documentation requirements and updates Chapter 
V of the Transfer pricing guidelines. Action 13 recommends a new three-
tiered transfer pricing documentation structure that includes a master file, a 
local file, and a country-by-country report. Together, these three documents 
are intended to simplify taxpayers’ compliance burden, provide tax 
administrations with more relevant information, and increase transparency. In 
regulating transfer pricing, Sweden follows the Transfer pricing guidelines 
and requires transfer pricing documentation. This thesis examines a pending 
Swedish implementation of Action 13 and addresses the following themes in 
connection with transfer pricing documentation: (1) proportionality; (2) 
relevant information; (3) confidentiality; (4) compliance; (5) the factors 
countries should consider when formulizing new transfer pricing 
documentation requirements; and (6) the immediate consequences Action 13 
has on multinational enterprises. As will be shown, regardless of when 
Sweden implements Action 13, the majority of Swedish multinational 
enterprises will already be compelled to compile three-tiered transfer pricing 
documentation that complies with the transfer pricing requirements in other 
jurisdictions. 
 
While the OECD contends that Action 13 strikes a balance between 
taxpayers’ compliance costs and tax administrations information needs, this 
thesis reveals that the new three-tiered transfer pricing documentation 
structure increases compliance costs for taxpayers as well as the 
administrative burden for tax administrations. Since taxpayers have struggled 
with what constitutes relevant information for the purposes of transfer pricing 
documentation, Action 13 specifically outlines the contents of the master file, 
local file, and country-by-country report. The Swedish transfer pricing 
documentation requirements are not aligned with this list of information and 
consequently, this thesis recognizes a clear discrepancy between the OECD’s 
new recommendations and Swedish legislation. Furthermore, the country-by-
country report has unleashed a debate about public disclosure of financial 
information; however, this thesis finds that the country-by-country report 
should remain confidential. Finally, this thesis analyzes compliance issues 
from three different perspectives accordingly: taxpayers’ compliance with 
transfer pricing documentation requirements, tax administrations compliance 
with following their administrative authority, and Sweden’s compliance with 
the OECD and the EU. Ultimately, this thesis questions the plausibility of 
standardized transfer pricing documentation, i.e. ‘one size fits all’.          
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Sammanfattning 
I ljuset av OECD/G20:s ’Base erosion and profit shifting’-projekt har 
’Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’ (OECD) 
undersökt internprissättningsdokumentation i Punkt 13 i handlingsplanen och 
har följaktligen publicerat ett reviderat Kapitel V i Transfer pricing 
guidelines. I Punkt 13 rekommenderas en ny tredelad struktur för 
internprissättningsdokumentation som inkluderar en master file, en local file 
och ett land för land-rapport. OECD menar att dessa tre dokument 
tillsammans kommer att minska skattebetalarnas börda att uppfylla 
dokumentationskraven, att tillförse skattemyndigheterna med relevant 
information, och öka transparens. I internprissättning följer Sverige Transfer 
pricing guidelines och verkställde dokumentationskrav för prissättningen 
mellan företag i intressegemenskap i 2007. Syftet med denna uppsats är att 
undersöka den pågående svensk implementering av Punkt 13 samt belyser 
följande huvudfrågor i anslutning till internprissättningsdokumentationen:  
(1) proportionalitet; (2) relevant information; (3) sekretess; (4) förenlighet; 
(5) vad som bör beaktas när länder formulera nya reglerna om 
dokumentationsskyldighet vid internprissättning; och (6) de omedelbara 
konsekvenserna som punkt 13 får för multinationella företag. Denna uppsats 
kommer att visa, att oavsett när Sverige implementerar Punkt 13 kommer de 
flesta svenska multinationella företag att redan ha utarbetat tredelad 
internprissättningsdokumentation som följer av regleringen i de andra länder 
där företaget är verksamt.  
 
Medan OECD påstår att Punkt 13 ger en balans mellan skattebetalarnas börda 
att uppfylla dokumentationskraven och nyttan av informationen till 
skattemyndigheterna, framhäver denna uppsats att tredelad 
internprissättningsdokumentation i verkligheten ökar både skattebetalarnas 
börda att uppfylla dokumentationskraven och skattemyndigheternas 
administrativa börda. Eftersom skattebetalarna tycker att det är svårt att 
avskilja vad som utgör relevant information, Punkt 13 specificerar vad som 
ska ingå i master file, local file och land för land-rapporten. Sveriges 
dokumentationsregler skiljer sig från OECD:s riktlinjer och därför görs det 
gällande att det föreligger en tydlig oförenlighet mellan OECD:s nya 
rekommendationer och svensk lagstiftning. Därutöver har land för land-
rapportering öppnat en offentlighetsdebatt, trots debatten anser denna uppsats 
att land för land-rapportering borde vara sekretessbelagd även 
fortsättningsvis. Slutligen analyseras förenlighetsproblemet utifrån tre 
perspektiv. Den första är skattebetalarnas uppfyllelse av 
internprissättningsdokumentation, den andra är skattemyndigheternas 
administrativa auktoritet och den tredje är Sveriges enlighet med OECD och 
EU. I slutändan problematiseras möjligheten till att införa standardiserad 
internprissättningsdokumentation, med andra ord; om verkligen ’one size fits 
all’.  
 3 
Preface 
I moved to Sweden nine years ago and attaining my law degree is something 
that I have always felt passionate about. My Swedish teacher, Lena Bruzaeus, 
encouraged me to pursue my dream in Sweden and prepared me for the 
challenges at law school. Even though I was the first person on the waiting 
list the first time I applied to the Faculty of Law at Lunds University; I was 
not accepted into the program. I felt discouraged and assumed that destiny 
had other plans in store. The following year I spontaneously reapplied and 
was accepted into the program. After four years of hard work I am proud to 
publish my Graduate Thesis.  
 
First, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor of Fiscal Law, Christina 
Moëll, for her encouragement and continuous feedback throughout the 
writing process. I looked forward to our interesting discussions and am 
thankful that I received the opportunity to attend the Transfer Pricing Tax 
Conference at Copenhagen Business School. I would also like to thank my 
mentor, Mikael Burlin, for his support and inspiration over the past two years.  
In addition, I would like to thank my father, David, and Eric Jorgensen for 
assisting me in the final editing of this thesis. Finally, I would like to thank 
my other-half, Jonas Lindstrand, for believing in me and not letting me give 
up. Last, I would like to thank my friends at Juridicum for all their pep-talks 
and my family for their continuous support.   
 
 
 
 
Elise Krumholz 
Lund, 31 December 2015 
 
 
 4 
Abbreviations 
 
Action Plan  Action plan on base erosion and profit shifting 
 
Action 7  Action 7 – Preventing the artificial avoidance of 
permanent establishment status 
 
Actions 8-10 Actions 8-10 – Aligning transfer pricing outcomes 
with value creation 
 
Action 13 Action 13 – Re-examine transfer pricing 
documentation 
 
BEPS  Base erosion profit shifting 
 
BEPS Report Addressing base erosion and profit shifting 
 
CbC  Country-by-country  
 
CCCTB  Common consolidated corporation tax base 
 
Code of conduct on TPD Resolution on a Code of conduct on transfer 
pricing documentation for associated enterprises 
in the European Union 
 
Discussion Draft Discussion draft on transfer pricing 
documentation and CbC reporting  
 
EU JTPF  European Union Joint Transfer Pricing Forum 
 
EU  European Union 
 
EUTPD  European Union transfer pricing documentation 
 
Final Report Transfer pricing documentation and country-by-
country Reporting, Action 13 – 2015 Final Report 
 
HFD  Swedish Supreme Administrative Court 
 
IL Income Tax Act  
(Inkomstskattelag, (1999:1229) 
 
LSK Tax Return and Statements of Income Act  
(lag (2001:1277) om självdeklarationer om 
kontrolluppgifter) 
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Memorandum  Memorandum on transfer pricing documentation 
and country by country reporting 
 
MNE  Multinational enterprise 
 
Model Legislation Model legislation related to Country-by-Country 
Reporting  
 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
 
OECD Model OECD Model tax convention on income and on 
capital 
 
Public Comments Comments received on discussion draft on 
transfer pricing documentation and CbC reporting 
 
Prop.  Government bill 
(Proposition) 
 
RF  Instrument of Government 
(Regeringsform (1974:152)) 
 
RÅ  Regeringsrättens årsbok 
 
SFF Tax Procedures Ordinance 
(Skatteförfarandeförordning, (2011:1261)) 
 
SFL Tax Procedures Act  
(Skatteförfarandelag, (2011:1244)) 
 
SKV  Swedish Tax Agency  
(Skatteverket) 
 
SKVFS Swedish Tax Agency Statute Book 
(Skatteverkets författningssamling)  
 
SKV M  Swedish Tax Agency Memorandum 
  (Skatteverkets meddelanden) 
 
TPD  Transfer pricing documentation 
 
TP Guidelines  Transfer pricing guidelines 2010 
 
White Paper White paper on transfer pricing documentation 
 
WP6 OECD Working Party 6 of the Committee of 
fiscal affairs 
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1 Introduction  
“What the BEPS are we talking about?” symbolizes the hallmark logo of the 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project and on October 
5, 2015, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) informed the public about, “What the BEPS have we done?”.1 
Indeed, the BEPS project signifies the largest change in international tax 
standards within the past century and these changes are occurring right now.2 
In order to prevent double non-taxation and the shifting of incomes to low-
tax jurisdictions, the BEPS project develops fifteen action plans. Together, 
these fifteen action plans create coherence between different interactions in 
domestic law, realign substance and taxation, and increase transparency.3 
Unsurprisingly, transfer pricing is one area of concern. Transfer pricing rules 
generally follow the arm’s length principle, which requires that the pricing of 
a transaction between two associated entities equates to the price that two 
independent entities would agree to. In order to verify compliance with the 
arm’s length principle, multinational enterprises (MNE) document their intra-
group cross-border transactions, i.e. transfer pricing documentation (TPD). 
Further guidance about the arm’s length principle and TPD resides in the 
OECD Transfer pricing guidelines for multinational enterprises and tax 
administrations4 (TP Guidelines).  
 
Action 13 – Re-examine transfer pricing documentation - (Action 13) of the 
BEPS project focuses on enhancing transparency and updates Chapter V of 
the TP Guidelines on TPD. In contrast to the previous provisions, the OECD 
clearly stipulates three objectives of TPD requirements: the taxpayer’s 
assessment of its compliance with the arm’s length principle, the provision of 
information for the tax administrations risk assessment, and the provision of 
information for a transfer pricing audit. In order to fulfil these three 
objectives, the OECD establishes a new three-tiered TPD standard, which 
includes a master file, a local file, and a country-by-country (CbC) report. The 
master file provides tax administrations with a high-level overview of the 
MNE group, the local file specifies the relevant transactions, and the CbC 
report assembles the global allocation of income. The OECD’s attempt to 
                                                 
1 Saint-Amans, Pascal & Russo, Raffaele: What the BEPS are we talking about?, OECD 
Forum 2013,  http://www.oecd.org/forum/what-the-beps-are-we-talking-about.htm, 
(Accessed: 2015-10-07). [cit: Saint-Amans & Russo 2013].  
BEPS webcast #8: Launch of 2015 BEPS reports, 6 October 2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AFtUOMVmovk, (Accessed: 2015-10-06).  
[cit: Technical Presentation 2015]. 
2 See Sect. 8 in OECD, Explanatory statement, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
Project, OECD, 2015, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-explanatory-statement-2015.pdf, 
(Accessed: 2015-10-12). [cit: Explanatory statement].  
3 OECD, Action plan on base erosion and profit shifting, OECD Publishing, 19 July 2013, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264202719-en, (Accessed: 2015-10-12).  
[cit: Action plan on base erosion and profit shifting], pp. 13-14. 
4 OECD Transfer pricing guidelines for multinational enterprises and tax administrations 
2010, OECD Publishing 2010, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/tpg-2010-en.  
[cit: OECD Transfer pricing guidelines 2010]. 
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standardize TPD requires new legislation and/or amendments to tax 
administration’s regulations in the majority of countries and Sweden is no 
exception.  
1.1 Purpose  
This thesis examines the OECD’s amendment to Chapter V of the TP 
Guidelines and more specifically explores the impact these amendments will 
have on an international level and locally in Sweden. Even though the OECD 
has reached a consensus about TPD’s three-tiered structure, some countries 
appear reluctant about implementing the OECD’s recommendations. While 
other countries began implementing the new documentation standards, 
specifically CbC reporting, before the OECD published the final reports. In 
the near future, MNEs face the administrative burden of preparing TPD that 
meets the new documentation standards, with the understanding that their 
countries of operation will implement/apply the new TPD requirements either 
through legislation or through the tax authority’s regulations.  
 
In Sweden, TPD requirements became mandatory in 2007. According to 
Prop. 2005/05:169, Effektivare skattekontroll5, mandatory TPD permits the 
Swedish Tax Agency (Skatteverket, SKV) to accomplish more effective 
control and provides a foundation for evaluating if the MNE’s transfer pricing 
coheres with the arm’s length principle. In addition, TPD increases MNE’s 
foreseeability, encourages awareness, and creates more uniformity.6 In order 
to clarify the Swedish TPD rules, the SKV adopted Skatteverkets föreskrifter 
om dokumentation av prissättning mellan företag i intressegemenskap7 
(SKVFS 2007:1), which specify TPD’s content. As acknowledged above, the 
OECD recommends a new three-tiered TPD standard that significantly defers 
from the current Swedish legislation. Sweden usually follows the OECD’s 
recommendations, but there remains uncertainty over to what extent the 
Swedish legal system will implement the updated Chapter V of the TP 
Guidelines.  
 
This thesis seeks to analyze a pending Swedish implementation of the updated 
Chapter V of the TP Guidelines and the subsequent impact Action 13 has on 
Swedish MNEs. More specifically, this thesis examines four central themes 
in relation to TPD requirements: proportionality, relevant information, 
confidentiality, and compliance.  
  
                                                 
5 More effective tax control.  
6 Prop. 2005/06:169 p. 102. 
7 Skatteverkets författningssamling – Skatteverkets föreskrifter om dokumentation av 
prissättning mellan företag i intressegemenskap (Regulations on the documentation of 
transfer pricing between associated enterprises), SKVFS 2007:1.  
 8 
1.2 Method and material 
This section describes the selected sources, their respective value, as well as 
their utilization throughout this thesis. In addition, the author shares the steps 
of her research process in further detail. The legal dogmatic method8 formally 
categorizes the selected method for this thesis. Professor Emeritus, Nils 
Jareborg describes the legal dogmatic method as a reconstruction of a legal 
system and emphasizes the importance of contributing to predictability and 
effective control within a legal system.9 Accordingly, the author has studied 
the current Swedish transfer pricing rules from a domestic and international 
perspective. Since TPD has many practical components, law journals provide 
a practitioners perspective of the current Swedish TPD requirements. In 
particular, articles from the Svensk Skattetidning conceptualize the responses 
to the 2007 Swedish implementation of TPD requirements and exemplify 
their ambiguity in guidance.10  
 
The research process began with a comprehensive study of the 2010 TP 
Guidelines, the Swedish rules about TPD, as well as the BEPS project. In 
order to highlight different perspectives and maintain a neutral position, the 
author studied an array of sources. Some of these sources are considered less 
traditional sources of information; however, they enhance the authenticity of 
this thesis. For example, YouTube showcases the OECD’s News 
Conference11 that publically released the BEPS project. The News 
Conference provides unique insight about the expectations and projections of 
the BEPS project. While webcasts from consultancy firms elaborate on the 
foreseen impact of BEPS on a more practical level. These electronic sources 
of information add unique perspectives that were simply not found in 
scholastic sources. Although, the recent publication of the finalized BEPS 
package also contributes to the sparsity of articles from academia and 
practitioners.  
 
The next step entailed chronologically organizing the developments of Action 
13 from initial proposal to the finalized report, Transfer pricing 
documentation and country-by-country reporting, Action 13- 2015 Final 
report12 (Final Report). During this stage of the process, the author analyzed 
                                                 
8 See Kleineman, Jan: “Rättsdogmatisk metod”, in Juridisk metodlära, Studentlitteratur, 
Lund 2013, pp. 21-45. [cit: Kleineman 2013]. 
9 Jareborg, Nils: Rättsdogmatik som vetenskap, Svensk Juristtidning, 2004, pp. 1-10. 
[cit: Jareborg 2004], pp. 4-5. 
10 In Sweden, there are two main legal journals that focus on tax issues, Svensk Skattetidning 
and Skattenytt. While both journals provide substantial information about transfer pricing, 
Svensk Skattetidning contains articles that were more suitable for this thesis.   
11 News Conference – launch of the 2015 BEPS package, 6 October 2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dVRVfIz9c64, (Accessed: 2015-10-06).  
[cit: News Conference 2015]. 
12 OECD, Transfer pricing documentation and country-by-country reporting, Action 13-2015 
Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241480-en, (Accessed: 2015-10-09).  
[cit: Action 13, Final Report 2015]. 
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commentary received by the OECD as well as scholarly articles in order to 
problematize the materialization of a new TPD standard. One struggle that 
emerged early on in the research process was the difference between the 
OECD’s and the Swedish sources of law. The OECD’s documents in this 
thesis constitute soft law and consequently, they do not have a legally binding 
status. The OECD utilizes discussion drafts as a literal ‘rough draft’ and as a 
venue for stakeholders to express their comments. In contrast, Sweden has a 
strong tradition in respect to the hierarchy of legal sources and recognizes 
legislative preparatory works as a source of law. However, the OECD drafts 
and the Swedish preparatory works do share some similarities. For instance, 
both document types make initial proposals and give the opportunity for 
constructive feedback prior to issuing the finalized document.  
 
One issue that complicated and delayed parts of the writing process pertained 
to the uncertainty over the outcomes of the BEPS project. Even though 
countries and practitioners already considered Action 13 finalized prior to the 
official publication in October 2015, it remained impossible to foresee when 
and how fast Sweden would respond. In 2014, the SKV published a report13 
that contains a survey about the industries opinions of the Swedish TPD rules. 
This report provides insightful reflections over the effectiveness of the 
Swedish TPD rules, as well as the SKV’s analysis of Action 13.  However, it 
was not until December 1, 2015 that the SKV held an official BEPS seminar 
for the public and formalized the consequences of Action 13 for Swedish 
MNEs and the SKV.14 Fortunately, the SKV’s BEPS seminar did not cause 
any drastic changes to this thesis. In the article, BEPS- Implementering i 
svensk skatterätt, Professors of Law, Anders Hultvist and Bertil Wiman, 
reflect over the Swedish implications of BEPS.15 Their article is the only 
article that specifically addresses the implementation of the BEPS project into 
the Swedish legal system. As a result, their article plays a central role in the 
author’s analysis of a pending Swedish implementation of Action 13 in 
section 4.3. The next section clarifies the scope of this thesis, as well as the 
author’s choice of theme. 
  
                                                 
13 Skatteverkets rapport – Utvärdering av reglerna om dokumentationsskyldighet vid 
internprissättning, 13 October 2014, dnr: 131 662842-13/113.  
[cit: Skatteverkets rapport 2014-10-13]. 
14 Skatteverkets seminarium om BEPS- projektet - Skattebaserodering och vinstförflyttning, 
Powerpoint, 1 December 2015, 
https://www.skatteverket.se/download/18.3810a01c150939e893f8165/1448976174430/Se
minarium+p%C3%A5+Skatteverket+om+BEPS+151201.pdf, (Accessed: 2015-12-01). 
[cit: Seminarium om BEPS 2015, Powerpoint].  
Skatteverkets seminarium om BEPS, Webcasts, 1 December 2015, 
https://www.skatteverket.se/omoss/press/presseminarier/seminariumombeps.4.3810a01c15
0939e893f7d63.html, (Accessed: 2015-12-01). [cit: Seminarium om BEPS 2015, Webcast]. 
15 Hultqvist, Anders & Wiman, Bertil: BEPS – Implementering i svensk skatterätt, Svensk 
Skattetidning, vol. 4, 2015, pp. 309-324. [cit: Hultqvist & Wiman 2015]. 
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1.3 Delimitation 
The BEPS project encompasses 15 Action Points and while they do integrate 
with each other, this thesis concentrates on Action 13. The author deliberately 
chose Action 13 due to the unanimous consensus at such an early stage in the 
BEPS project. Still, the domestic implementation of Action 13 has varied 
between countries and Sweden has not been an early adopter of the OECD’s 
new guidance on TPD. Thus, the author cannot account for the forthcoming 
changes of the Swedish transfer pricing rules. The addition of CbC reporting 
to TPD raises multiple aspects, such as information exchange and plausible 
amendments to double tax conventions.  Even though these ramifications bear 
significance, they are not the core of this thesis. Instead, this thesis 
concentrates on the pending implementation of the updated Chapter V of the 
TP Guidelines within the Swedish legal system. Due to the CbC reporting 
threshold of annual consolidated group revenue over EUR 750 million, the 
author excludes small and medium enterprises from the domain of this thesis. 
Thus, this thesis focuses solely on enterprises that will probably encounter 
CbC reporting. Lastly, the author has practical experience in writing TPD, 
which contributes to the authenticity of this thesis.16 
1.4 Terminology 
The BEPS project contains an extreme amount of abbreviations and reports 
that characterize the area of international tax law and especially the OECD. 
Therefore, the author recommends that readers whom are less familiar with 
the BEPS project have the abbreviations list readily available. While reading 
this thesis, the two most important abbreviations to remember are transfer 
pricing documentation (TPD) and Country-by-Country (CbC) reporting, 
since these terms embody the core of Action 13. In connection to Action 13, 
the author simplifies the title of important documents in order to keep the text 
fluent. This list can be seen in Figure 2. In addition, the Final Report is simply 
a compilation of the previous three Action 13 reports: Guidance on transfer 
pricing documentation and country-by-country reporting17, Action 13: 
Guidance on the implementation of transfer pricing documentation and 
country-by-country reporting18, and Action 13: Country-by-country reporting 
implementation package19. Another important point to clarify regards the 
                                                 
16 I would like to especially thank the Tax Department at Stena for giving me invaluable 
practical experience in transfer pricing. 
17 OECD, Guidance on transfer pricing documentation and country-by-country reporting, 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, 16 September 2014, 
http:dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264219236-en, (Accessed: 2015-10-12).  
[cit: Guidance on transfer pricing documentation and country-by-country reporting]. 
18 OECD, Action 13: Guidance on the implementation of transfer pricing documentation and 
country-by-country reporting, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD, 
2015, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-action-13-guidance-implementation-tp-documentation-
cbc-reporting.pdf, (Accessed: 2015-10-12). [cit: Guidance on the implementation of transfer 
pricing documentation and country-by-country reporting].   
19 OECD, Action 13: Country-by-country reporting implementation package, OECD/G20 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD, 2015, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-
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reference to Chapter V of the TP Guidelines. In order to avoid redundancy, 
Chapter V always refers to Chapter V of the TP Guidelines. Since the OECD 
has not issued new TP Guidelines, the ‘updated Chapter V’ can be found in 
the Final Report and in Guidance on the implementation of transfer pricing 
documentation and country-by-country reporting20.  
 
Writing about the Swedish legal system in English may create some 
confusion for Swedish readers about what legal term or authority is being 
referred to. In order to avoid misunderstandings, the author includes the 
Swedish translation in parenthesis for specific Swedish legal terminology or 
bodies of government. The author also intentionally utilizes the Swedish 
abbreviation for the Swedish Tax Agency (SKV).   
1.5 Disposition 
In order to evaluate Sweden’s pending implementation of the updated Chapter 
V of the TP Guidelines, the remainder of this thesis is organized accordingly. 
Chapter 2 establishes the basic principles behind the arm’s length principle 
and TPD. The chapter introduces the reader to the TP Guidelines and the TPD 
standard prior to the BEPS project. Chapter 3 highlights the BEPS project 
and shows the development of Action 13. The implications of the updated 
Chapter V of the TP Guidelines will also be analyzed on a more international 
scale. In Chapter 4, the focus shifts to TPD within the context of the Swedish 
legal system. Chapter 4 begins with exploring the responses to the 2007 
implementation of Swedish TPD requirements and then examines the 
effectiveness of these requirements. The chapter ends with an analysis about 
the implementation of Action 13 into the Swedish legal system. Chapter 5 
presents a case study about the Paradise Cruises group, which illustrates the 
immediate effects of three-tiered TPD requirements. This leads into a deeper 
analysis of TPD in light of Action 13 and the forthcoming Swedish 
implementation. Finally, four central themes - proportionality, relevant 
information, confidentiality, and compliance - reoccur throughout this thesis 
and section 5.2 examines these themes more thoroughly.  
                                                 
pricing/beps-action-13-country-by-country-reporting-implementation-package.pdf, 
(Accessed: 2015-10-12). [cit: Country-by-country reporting implementation package]. 
20 Guidance on transfer pricing documentation and country-by-country reporting. 
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2 Transfer pricing documentation  
In simple terms, transfer pricing refers to the pricing of business transactions 
between related entities. It is assumed that unrelated entities behave 
according to the market and seek to maximize their own profit. While other 
behaviors or objectives can influence related entities business decisions, 
which can hypothetically lead to a disproportionate division of profits 
between different tax jurisdictions. In order to avoid a skewed division of 
global profits between countries, tax authorities require that MNEs calculate 
their intra-group cross-border transactions as if they were two unrelated 
entities.21 The remainder of this chapter familiarizes the reader with the arm’s 
length principle within the context of the OECD and the Swedish legal 
system. This chapter also examines the purpose and content of TPD from 
three perspectives: the TP Guidelines, the European Union (EU), and 
Sweden. 
2.1 The arm’s length principle 
The 1927 League of Nations addressed the allocation of profits and the 1935 
draft model convention referred to an arm’s length methodology.22 The 
OECD adopted the arm’s length principle and the first paragraph of Article 9 
of the OECD Model tax convention on income and on capital23  (OECD 
Model) states that: 
 
[When] conditions are made or imposed between…two [associated] enterprises in 
their commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made 
between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those 
conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but by reason of those conditions, 
have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed 
accordingly.24 
 
In 1979, the OECD issued the TP Guidelines, which clarify the application of 
the arm’s length principle.25 In the Commentaries to Article 9 of the OECD 
Model, the Council of the OECD reiterates that the TP Guidelines represent 
internationally agreed principles and provide recommendations for the 
application of the arm’s length principle.26 Some OECD Members have 
incorporated the TP Guidelines into domestic legislation, while other 
                                                 
21 Henshall, John: Global transfer pricing: principles and practice, 2. ed., Bloomsbury 
Professional, Haywards Heath, 2013. [cit: Henshall 2013], pp. 1-5. 
22 Henshall 2013, p. 11. Miller, Angharad & Oats, Lynne: Principles of international 
taxation, 4. ed., Bloomsbury Professional, Haywards Heath, 2014.  
[cit: Miller & Oats 2014], p. 356. 
23 OECD Model tax convention on income and capital, condensed version 2014, OECD 
Publishing 2014, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/mtc_cond-2014-en.  
[cit: OECD Model Convention 2014]. 
24 Article 9.1 of the OECD Model Convention 2014.  
25 Henshall 2013, p. 6. Miller & Oats 2014, p. 357. 
26 Sect. 1 of the Commentaries on Article 9 of the OECD Model Convention 2014. 
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jurisdictions, such as Sweden, utilize the TP Guidelines as a means for 
interpreting the domestic legislation of the arm’s length principle.27  
 
Professor of International Tax Law, Michael Lang, at Vienna University of 
Economics and Business emphasizes that the TP Guidelines provide an 
international interpretation of the arm’s length principle. According to 
international public law, double tax conventions can only limit tax liabilities, 
but they cannot generate them.28 Similarly, the TP Guidelines do not justify a 
legal basis for a transfer pricing adjustment; instead, tax authorities apply the 
domestic rules when performing transfer pricing adjustments.29 The next 
section presents the TP Guidelines with a focus on Chapter V, since Action 
13 amends this chapter.  
2.2 Transfer pricing guidelines 2010 
The OECD published the most recent version of the TP Guidelines in 2010 
and it is this version that section 2.2 describes. Chapter I of the TP Guidelines 
explains the arm’s length principle more explicitly and emphasizes that it 
promotes the growth of international trade and investment. The TP Guidelines 
clarify that the arm’s length approach treats the members of the MNE group 
as separate entities, as if they were independent entities. More specifically, a 
comparability analysis focuses on whether the nature of controlled 
transactions, i.e. between associated entities, differs from comparable 
uncontrolled transactions, i.e. between independent entities. Since transfer 
pricing is not an exact science, the OECD recognizes the challenges of finding 
comparable transactions. As a result, transfer pricing necessitates that both 
taxpayers and tax authorities utilize sound judgment. For example, associated 
enterprises may engage in transactions that reflect other circumstances, such 
as group synergies. Thus, finding adequate information that shows that the 
controlled transactions fulfil the arm’s length principle can be challenging for 
taxpayers.30  
 
Chapter II of the TP Guidelines describes the different transfer pricing 
methods: comparable uncontrolled price, resale price, cost plus, profit split, 
and transactional net margin method. The chapter begins with clarifying the 
selection of the most appropriate method and reiterates that no one method is 
suitable in every possible situation. Due to the complexity and nature of 
certain transactions, the TP Guidelines permit the application of more than 
one method. Taxpayers also have the option of selecting a non-OECD 
                                                 
27 Henshall 2013, p. 12. 
28 In the Swedish legal system, Gustaf Lindencrona has coined the expression, ’gyllene 
regeln.’ See Hultqvist & Wiman 2015, p. 315 for a further explanation. 
29 Lang, Michael: Introduction to the law of double taxation conventions, 2. ed., Linde, Wien, 
2013. [cit: Lang 2013], Sect. 46 & 478. 
30 Chap. 1, Sect. B, Sects. 1.6-1.13 of the OECD Transfer pricing guidelines 2010. Kindly 
note that Chap. 1, Sect. D of the TP Guidelines has recently been replaced in its entirety. 
Please see, OECD, Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, Actions 8-10: 
2015 Final Reports, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, 
Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241244-en, (Accessed: 2015-11-15).  
[cit: Actions 8-10, Final Reports 2015]. 
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recognized transfer pricing method, as long the chosen method fulfils the 
following two conditions. The selected method cannot substitute the OECD-
recognized methods and it must comply with the arm’s length principle.31 
 
After selecting the most appropriate transfer pricing method, the next step 
entails applying the selected method through a comparability analysis. 
Chapter III of the TP Guidelines explains the comparability analysis, which 
involves the identification of potential comparables. In addition, the 
comparability analysis contains a conclusion about whether the controlled 
transactions are consistent with the arm’s length principle referred to in 
Article 9.1 of the OECD Model. In order to verify that the controlled 
transactions comply with the arm’s length principle, taxpayers document 
information, i.e. TPD, which then facilitates tax administrations transfer 
pricing inquiries.32  
2.2.1 Chapter V of the Transfer pricing guidelines 2010 
In order for the reader to grasp the differences between the previous and 
updated version of Chapter V of the TP Guidelines, this sub-section solely 
reviews Chapter V of the 2010 TP Guidelines.33 Chapter V provides general 
guidance about TPD for tax administrations and taxpayers. More specifically, 
it outlines what tax administrations should take into account when developing 
TPD rules and what type of information taxpayers should include in their 
documentation. Since tax administrations generally bear the burden of proof, 
TPD supplies them with adequate information and allows them to perform 
transfer pricing assessments. The TP Guidelines even suggest that incomplete 
TPD may shift the burden of proof to the taxpayer.34 Thus, taxpayers have a 
good incentive to complete TPD.     
 
The following sections in Chapter V, elaborate on the formation of TPD rules 
and procedures. When taxpayers assess their transfer pricing, the OECD 
refers to utilizing ‘prudent business management principles’. This principle 
entails that taxpayers should be able to provide a written explanation about 
the nature of their business activities and transfer pricing upon the tax 
administration’s request. The TP Guidelines also articulate that there should 
also be a balance between the tax administration’s need for the documents 
and the taxpayer’s administrative burden of creating or obtaining them. At the 
time of filing tax returns, the TP Guidelines suggest that information 
disclosure about transfer pricing should be limited to what is necessary to 
determine the need for a further transfer pricing inquiry. Therefore, tax 
administrations should not require TPD at the commencement of the tax 
return filing stage. As long as the costs are not disproportionately high, 
taxpayers should provide tax administrations with reasonable documents for 
transfer pricing assessments. Thus, Chapter V encourages taxpayers to keep 
adequate records, especially since the voluntary provision of TPD increases 
                                                 
31 Sects. 2.1-2.11 of the OECD Transfer pricing guidelines 2010.  
32 Sects. 3.1-3.3 of the OECD Transfer pricing guidelines 2010.  
33 Section 3.3 discusses the updated Chapter V of the TP Guidelines. 
34 Sects. 5.1-5.2 of the OECD Transfer pricing guidelines 2010. 
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the likelihood that tax administrations will accept their transfer price. 
Correspondingly, tax administrations should request documents that are 
reasonably accessible after the relevant transaction has incurred. Finally, tax 
administrations should ensure confidentiality of the taxpayer’s information.35  
 
The next section in Chapter V clarifies what constitutes relevant information 
for assessing transfer prices and suggests what should be included in TPD. 
First, the TP Guidelines acknowledge that the extent and nature of 
information in TPD depends on the individual circumstances. Therefore, the 
TP Guidelines recommendations should not be interpreted as a minimum 
level of compliance or as an exhaustive list of information. Chapter V makes 
the following suggestions for the content of TPD.  
 
- A company analysis that includes information related to each 
associated enterprise involved in the controlled transaction under 
review, such as an organizational and operational structure of the 
business. 
- An industry analysis that explains the market conditions that affect 
the taxpayer, this could include regulations and competitors.  
- A functional analysis that explains the functions performed, risks 
assumed and assets owned.  
- Any financial information that may be useful for comparing profit 
and loss between the associated enterprises.  
- An explanation of the selection and application of the transfer 
pricing method used to establish the transfer price and its 
consistency with the arm’s length principle. This should also reflect 
the OECD’s recommendations in Chapter II and III of the TP 
Guidelines.36   
 
Chapter V concludes with reiterating the balance between taxpayers’ costs for 
producing TPD and the tax administrations’ need for the documents. ‘Prudent 
business management principles’ steer the extent of the documentation 
process and reflect the same sound principles when enterprises evaluate a 
business decision. Finally, to ensure that taxpayers provide tax 
administrations with adequate information for a transfer pricing assessment, 
while at the same time avoiding excessive documentation requirements, the 
TP Guidelines encourage cooperation between tax administrations and 
taxpayers.37 
  
                                                 
35 Sects. 5.3-5.15 of the OECD Transfer pricing guidelines 2010. 
36 Sects. 5.16-5.27 of the OECD Transfer pricing guidelines 2010. 
37 Sects. 5.28-5.29 of the OECD Transfer pricing guidelines 2010. 
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2.3 EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum 
While the OECD focuses on tax treaty law and allocating taxing rights 
between countries, the EU works towards establishing a Single Market.38 This 
important difference means that the EU focuses on establishing greater 
harmony between Member States than the OECD does.39 Since mutual 
agreement procedures in tax treaties failed to eliminate double taxation, the 
European Commission formed the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum (EU 
JTPF) in 2002. The EU JTPF consists of representatives from the tax 
administrations of the fifteen Member States and ten representatives from the 
European business community. The original intent of the EU JTPF was to 
ratify the Arbitration Convention40, which only applies to transfer pricing 
disputes and guarantees the elimination of double taxation.41  
 
In regards to TPD, businesses struggled with fulfilling country specific 
documentation requirements in the different Member States. Therefore, the 
EU JTPF originally believed that a single documentation package would 
alleviate the compliance costs for businesses. The EU JTPF agreed upon a 
two-part package, consisting of a master file and a country-specific file. In 
2006, the Council issued a Resolution on a Code of conduct on transfer 
pricing documentation for associated enterprises in the European Union42 
(Code of conduct on TPD). Contrary to EU directives, which Member States 
have to implement into national law by a specific deadline, a Code of conduct 
signifies a political commitment. Therefore, Member States are not obligated 
to incorporate a Code of conduct into legislation.43  
 
The Code of conduct on TPD states that Member States will accept European 
Union transfer pricing documentation (EUTPD). Thus, MNEs can follow the 
EUTPD format in the majority of cases within the EU. EUTPD also allows 
tax administrations to perform risk assessments and select which inter-
company transactions require further review. When requesting information, 
the Council advises against Member States imposing an unreasonable 
administrative burden on MNEs.44  
 
                                                 
38 Miller & Oats 2014, p. 130. 
39 Author’s observation.  
40 Code of conduct for the effective implementation of the Convention on the elimination of 
double taxation in connection with the adjustment of profits of associated enterprises, 28 July 
2006, C176/8. [cit:  2006/C176/02]. 
41 Gillett, Philip: “Transfer pricing disputes in the European Union”, in Resolving transfer 
pricing disputes: a global analysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, pp. 165-
187. [cit: Gillett 2012], pp. 170-171. 
42 Resolution of the Council and of the representatives of the governments of the Member 
States, meeting within the Council, on a Code of Conduct on transfer pricing documentation 
for associated enterprises in the European Union, 20 June 2006, nr. 9738/06. [cit: 2006/C 
176/01]. For more information about the Code of conduct on transfer pricing documentation 
see: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-05-414_en.htm, (Accessed: 2015-10-01). 
43 Gillett 2012, pp. 173-175. 
44 2006/C 176/01. 
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EUTPD consists of a master file and a country-specific file. The master file 
contains standardized information that seems relevant for all Member States 
and provides a ‘blueprint’ of the MNE group.45 While the country-specific file 
supplements the master file and addresses the specific transactions under 
review.46 In contrast to Chapter V of the TP Guidelines, EUTPD contains 
concise information about the content of TPD. Even though the Code of 
conduct on TPD is a soft-law initiative, the EU JTPF encourages the 
application of EUTPD within the EU. At a recent meeting, the EU JTPF 
recognizes that the structure and contents in the Code of Conduct on TPD 
largely reflects the OECD’s development of TPD in Action 13.47 The EU- 
JTPF continues to monitor the BEPS project, evaluate strategies that allow 
tax administrations to perform effective assessments, and develop 
information technology tools to minimize taxpayers’ compliance burden.48  
2.4 Swedish legal system 
Even though the TP Guidelines do not formally constitute Swedish 
legislation, the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court (Högsta 
förvaltningsdomstolen, HFD) declares in the Shell-case49 that the TP 
Guidelines present a fair and well-balanced view of transfer pricing issues 
that provide guidance for the application of the arm’s length principle. In 
Prop. 2005/06:169, the Ministry of Finance (Finansdepartementet) reiterates 
the HFD’s statement and pronounces that the TP Guidelines represent 
international principles within the area of transfer pricing, where the SKV as 
well as taxpayers can retrieve invaluable guidance.50 This entails that the 
Swedish courts, the SKV, and taxpayers can apply and retrieve guidance from 
the TP Guidelines. The following two sub-sections describe the context of the 
arm’s length principle in Swedish law, in addition to providing background 
information about the 2007 Swedish implementation of TPD requirements.  
2.4.1 Arm’s length principle 
Sect. 19 of Chap. 14 of the Income Tax Act (Inkomstskattelag, (1999:1229), 
IL) articulates the arm’s length principle, also known as the correction rule 
(korrigeringsregeln). According to Sect. 19 of Chap. 14 of the IL, if an 
enterprise has reduced taxable income due to conditions that differ from what 
two independent enterprises would have agreed to, then the SKV may adjust 
the enterprise’s income. However, this only applies if the enterprise fulfils the 
following three conditions: 
                                                 
45 Sects. 4.1-4.2, 2006/C 176/01. 
46 Sects. 5.1-5.2, 2006/C 176/01. 
47 Section 3.2 of this thesis also demonstrates how EUTPD influenced the OECD’s 
development of the updated Chapter V of the TP Guidelines. 
48 JTPF Program of Work 2015-2019, EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum, Meeting 25 June 
2015, DOC: JTPF/005/FINAL/2015/EN. [cit: JTPF/005/FINAL/2015/EN], pp. 8-9. 
49 RÅ 1991 ref. 107.  
50 Prop. 2005/06:169, p. 89. 
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- the enterprise, which due to the conditions made between the 
enterprises receives an increased income will not be liable to tax in 
Sweden according to IL or according to a tax treaty; 
- it can be reasonably established that the enterprises are associated; 
and  
- it is not evident from the circumstances that the conditions were 
made for other reasons than for the reason of the enterprises being 
associated.  
 
Sect. 20 of Chap. 14 of the IL defines when enterprises are associated and 
requires that the enterprise satisfy one of the following conditions: 
 
- an enterprise participates directly or indirectly in the management, 
control or capital of another enterprise, or 
- the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the 
management, control or capital of both enterprises. 
 
As noted in the above stipulations, enterprises are not obliged to document 
their transfer prices or submit documentation to the SKV. The IL requires that 
enterprises acknowledge and follow the arm’s length principle when they 
assess their pricing of intra-group cross-border transactions. Therefore, in 
Prop. 2005/06:169, the Ministry of Finance recommends implementing 
formal TPD requirements in the Tax Return and Statements of Income Act 
(lag om självdeklarationer och kontrolluppgifter, (2001:1277), LSK). Prop. 
2005/06:169 recognizes the complexity of transfer pricing and acknowledges 
that other countries require MNEs to compile documentation for the tax 
agencies transfer pricing controls. Furthermore, Swedish TPD rules should 
not have an adverse effect on the application of the Swedish correction rule 
or the SKV’s initial burden of proof. The Ministry of Finance postulates that 
TPD alleviates double taxation and permits a thorough analysis of an 
enterprises transfer prices. Therefore, the Ministry of Finance conceives that 
obligatory TPD requirements would benefit both the SKV and Swedish 
enterprises. In conclusion, formal documentation requirements: increase the 
effectivity of tax controls, contribute to enterprises foreseeability, and create 
more uniformity.51  
 
The Ministry of Finance proposes that the regulations follow an acceptable 
international standard and only require essential information for performing 
a transfer pricing assessment. Since TPD regulations seek to expedite a 
thorough transfer pricing risk assessment, it deems sufficient for enterprises 
to send in their TPD upon the SKV’s request. In addition, Prop. 2005/06:169 
articulates enforcing stricter demands on the documentation of complex, 
higher valued transactions in comparison to simple everyday transactions.52   
 
  
                                                 
51 Prop. 2005/06:169 pp. 88, 99-102. 
52 Prop. 2005/06:169 pp. 103, 110. 
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In accordance with Chapter V of the TP Guidelines53, Prop. 2005/06:169 
recommends that TPD consist of five main parts:  
 
- a legal and operational description of the company, including an 
industry analysis and relevant business strategies; 
- a description of the relevant intra-group cross-border transactions, 
for example services, products, intangible assets, financial 
transactions; 
- a functional analysis which serves as a basis for identifying 
comparable transactions and selecting an appropriate transfer 
pricing method; 
- a description of the applied transfer pricing method; and 
- a comparability analysis.54 
2.4.2 Swedish transfer pricing documentation 
requirements 
Prop. 2005/06:169 led to the stipulation of Sects. 2a-2b of Chap. 19 of the 
LSK, which require that MNEs have written documentation explaining the 
MNE’s transfer pricing, i.e. TPD. Sect. 2b of Chap. 19 of the LSK outlines 
the contents of TPD and these correspond to the five previously named 
components in Prop. 2005/06:169. In addition, the government, or whom the 
government authorizes, could decide on additional regulations (föreskrifter) 
that specify the required content of TPD.  
 
There remains controversy over the extent in which the SKV can implement 
regulations that complement legislation, i.e. fill out the law. Professor of Tax 
Law, Robert Påhlsson at the University of Gothenburg analyzes the depth of 
the SKV’s authority to stipulate regulations in his book, Konstitutionell 
Skatterätt. It is crucial to remember that the right to tax has to be based on 
legislation (föreskriftskravet), in simplified terms no law, no tax. Sect. 2 of 
Chap. 8 of the Instrument of Government (Regeringsform (1974:152), RF) 
states that legislation about the relationship between the private and public 
sector has to be implemented through legislation. Thus, in the area of tax law, 
the Riksdag (Swedish Parliament) exercises absolute legislative power and 
cannot delegate their legislative authority to the Government (Regeringen).55 
However, Sect. 7 of Chap. 8 of the RF contains an exception, which allows 
the Government to delegate certain regulations to authorities 
(verkställighetsföreskrifter), including the SKV. The Government exercises 
the authority to delegate two categories of regulations; the first category 
pertains to administrative discrepancies and the second category encompasses 
materialistic supplements to legislation.56 This infers that the Government can 
delegate the SKV the authority to clarify legislation through administrative 
regulations. Based on the preparatory works, the SKV’s regulations should 
                                                 
53 See Sects. 5.16-5.27 of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 2010.  
54 Prop. 2005/06:169 pp. 103-107.  
55 See Sect. 3 of Chap. 8 of the RF. 
56 Påhlsson, Robert: Konstitutionell skatterätt, 3. ed., Iustus, Uppsala, 2013.  
[cit: Påhlsson 2013], pp. 29-32. 
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not add something essentially new to the law or anything that a taxpayer 
perceives as a new enforcement.57  
 
Professor Påhlsson presents SKVFS 2007:1 as an example of when the SKV 
has received criticism for going outside the scope of their administrative 
authority. However, the courts have never taken a stance to this position.58 
Professor of Financial Law, Anders Hultqvist, at Stockholm University, 
questions the SKV’s regulations on TPD. Professor Hultqivst notes that if the 
SKV’s regulations go outside their delegation authority, then taxpayers can 
interpret the regulations as guidelines rather than obligations. Consequently, 
Professor Hultqvist is a proponent of formal legislation, since it increases 
taxpayers’ foreseeability.59 This thesis considers that SKVFS 2007:1 remains 
inside the scope of the SKV’s authority. Prop. 2005/06:169 specifically 
postulates that the TP Guidelines provide guidance for the SKV as well as 
taxpayers. In addition, SKVFS 2007:1 signifies a Swedish translation of 
Chapter V of the TP Guidelines; consequently, the author perceives the 
administrative regulations as a Swedish codification of the TP Guidelines.  
 
The reader needs to distinguish between the SKV’s regulations (föreskrifter) 
and memorandums (meddelanden). The SKV’s regulations are legally 
binding rules that the SKV receives the authority to implement. In contrast, 
memorandums send signals to taxpayers about what the SKV accepts and 
clarifies how the SKV interprets their regulations. Memorandums build upon 
the SKV’s administrative praxis, but they are not legally binding.60 In the area 
of transfer pricing, the SKV has produced the memorandum, Skatteverkets 
information om dokumentation av prissättning av transaktioner mellan 
företag i intressegemenskap61 (SKV M 2007:25) about how to interpret 
SKVFS 2007:1.62 Professor of Tax Law (Emeritus), Sven-Olof Lodin, adds 
that the SKV’s memorandum represents how tax officials would like 
taxpayers to format TPD, but not how they have to.63  
 
Lastly, SKVFS 2007:1 and SKV M 2007:25 remain applicable, but Sects. 15-
16 of Chap. 39 of the Tax Procedures Act (Skatteförfarandelag (2011:1244), 
SFL) have replaced Sect. 2a of Chap. 19 of the LSK. The new stipulations 
require that enterprises document international transactions between 
associated enterprises, as defined in Sect. 20 of Chap. 14 of the IL. 
Furthermore, TPD needs to contain adequate information for a transfer 
                                                 
57 Prop. 1973:90 p. 211. 
58 Påhlsson 2013, pp. 32-33. 
59 Hultqvist, Anders: Om föreskriftsregleringen angående dokumentationskravet vid 
internprissättning, Svensk Skattetidning, vol. 6-7, 2007, pp. 404-411.  
[cit: Hultqvist 2007], pp. 406-407.  
60 Påhlsson 2013, pp. 106-107. 
61 Skatteverkets meddelanden – Skatteverkets information om dokumentation av prissättning 
av transaktioner mellan företag i intressegemenskap, (Information on the documentation of 
transfer pricing between associated entities), SKV M 2007:25. 
62 Section 4.1 of this thesis examines the specific stipulations in SKVFS 2007:1 in connection 
to the legal doctrine from the time era.  
63 Lodin, Sven-Olof: En kommentar till en kommentar om internprissättningsdokumentation, 
Svensk Skattetidning, vol. 5, 2007, pp. 315-319. [cit: Lodin 2007], pp. 318-319. 
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pricing assessment, such that an adjustment in accordance to Sect. 19 of Chap. 
14 of the IL can materialize. In addition, Sect. 9 of Chap. 9 of the Tax 
Procedures Ordinance (Skatteförfarandeförordning (2011:1261), SFF) has 
replaced Sect. 2b of Chap. 19 of the LSK. Sect. 9 of Chap. 9 of the SFF 
complements the stipulations in SFL and explicitly allows the SKV to issue 
further regulations about the information in TPD.  
2.5 Summary 
In summary, the TP Guidelines provide recommendations for the application 
of the arm’s length principle as stipulated in the Commentaries to Article 9 of 
the OECD Model. Accordingly, MNEs document their intra-group cross-
border transactions as evidence of their compliance with the arm’s length 
principle. Chapter V of the TP Guidelines clarifies the content and purpose of 
TPD. In addition, Chapter V briefly explains what constitutes relevant 
information and advises taxpayers to use their ‘prudent business management 
principles’ when compiling TPD. The EU JTPF has adopted EUTPD as an 
alternative for Member States in the EU. In contrast to the TP Guidelines, 
EUTPD divides documentation into a master file and a country-specific file; 
thereby, providing an overview of the MNE group and specifics of the 
relevant transactions respectively.  
 
In the Swedish legal system, Sect. 19 of Chap. 14 of the IL declares the arm’s 
length principle and is also known as the correction rule. The Shell-case and 
Prop. 2005/06:169 confirm that the TP Guidelines provide guidance about the 
application of the Swedish correction rule.  According to Sects. 15-16 of 
Chap. 39 of the SFL, associated enterprises are obliged to document intra-
group cross-border transactions.  Sect. 9 of Chap. 9 of the SFF specifies the 
five components of TPD – a legal and operational description of the company, 
information about the relevant transactions, a functional analysis, a 
description of the applied transfer pricing method, and a comparability 
analysis. In addition, the SKV provides further guidance about TPD in 
SKVFS 2007:1 and SKV M 2007:25.  It remains controversial whether 
SKVFS 2007:1 goes outside the scope of the SKV’s authority. According to 
Professors Påhlsson and Hultqvist, the regulations have nevertheless created 
some uncertainty. 
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3 Action 13  
This section begins with background information about the OECD/G20 BEPS 
Project and highlights the development of Action 13. In contrast to other 
action points64, Action 13 was relatively finalized at an early stage in the 
BEPS Project; thus, indicating the strong international consensus to make 
CbC reporting an international standard. The comments in response to the 
Discussion draft on transfer pricing documentation and CbC reporting65 
(Discussion Draft) demonstrate the industries major issues and concerns 
about Action 13; therefore, sub-section 3.2.1 elaborates specifically on the 
Discussion Draft. In addition, sub-section 3.2.2 examines the effectiveness of 
CbC reporting and the possibility of public disclosure. Chapter 3 concludes 
with an overview of the Final Report and expectations about local 
implementation.  
3.1 Base erosion and profit shifting  
The OECD defines BEPS66 as tax planning strategies that reduce corporate 
taxes by optimizing the interaction of domestic tax systems to achieve double 
non-taxation or by shifting profits to jurisdictions with low taxation. It is 
crucial to remember that the gaps between two tax systems exists within the 
domestic tax rules; thus, many tax planning strategies are technically legal. 
Just as a collusion of two jurisdictions tax rules can lead to double taxation, 
they can also lead to double non-taxation.67 The following example highlights 
this issue: 
 
The interaction of withholding tax rules in one country, the territorial taxation system 
in another country, and the entity characterisation rules in a third country may 
combine to make it possible for certain transactions to occur in a way that gives rise 
to no current tax and have the effect of shifting income to a jurisdiction where, for 
various reasons, no tax is imposed.68 
 
                                                 
64 For example, the transactional profit split methods will not be finalized until the first half 
of 2017. See Sect. 67 in OECD, BEPS - frequently asked questions, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-frequentlyaskedquestions.htm#DCs, (Accessed: 2015-10-08). 
[cit: BEPS – frequently asked questions]. 
65 OECD, Discussion draft on transfer pricing documentation and CbC reporting, Public 
consultation, OECD, 30 January 2014, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/discussion-
draft-transfer-pricing-documentation.pdf, (Accessed: 2015-09-24).  
[cit: Discussion draft 2014]. 
66 If you would like to read more about the implications and measuring of BEPS, please see: 
OECD, Measuring and monitoring BEPS, Action 11 – 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241343-en, (Accessed: 2015-10-09).  
[cit: Action 11, Final Report 2015]. 
67 OECD, Addressing base erosion and profit shifting, OECD Publishing, 12 February 2013, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264192744-en, (Accessed: 2015-10-12).  
[cit: Addressing base erosion and profit shifting], p. 39. BEPS – frequently asked questions 
contains a similar in Sects. 117-119. 
68 Addressing base erosion and profit shifting, p. 44. 
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As this example demonstrates, BEPS results from the interaction of different 
jurisdictions, which is why a domestic, unilateral approach would not combat 
BEPS. The OECD estimates that BEPS accounts for revenue losses of USD 
100 to 240 billion annually. In addition, the OECD recognizes that unilateral 
approaches may exacerbate the situation by undermining international tax 
principles and deterring international trade and investment. Since taxation 
stands as a national sovereignty, international coordination deems necessary 
to effectively protect domestic tax bases.69  
3.1.1     OECD/G20 BEPS project 
During 2012, the G20 Leaders70 agreed upon the urgent need to prevent BEPS 
and the necessity of strengthening international tax standards. The G20 
Leaders called upon the OECD to investigate the existence and cause of 
BEPS. This led to the OECD’s report, Addressing base erosion and profit 
shifting (BEPS Report), which stresses the need for a comprehensive action 
plan that provides countries with instruments to align taxation with real 
economic activity. The BEPS Report observes that even though corporate 
income tax rates decreased between 2000 and 2011 in OECD member 
countries, this did not correspond to a decline in the corporate tax burden. The 
OECD measures the corporate tax burden as corporate income tax receipts as 
a percentage of GDP. Figure 1 exemplifies the OECD’s observation.71   
 
FIGURE 172. TAXES ON CORPORATE INCOME AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF GDP IN OECD COUNTRIES 
 
 
In addition, the BEPS Report reconsiders transfer pricing issues and questions 
the practicality of contractual risks. Therefore, the BEPS report focuses on 
                                                 
69 Sect. 2 & 5, Explanatory statement. 
70 The G20 is a forum of 19 countries plus the European Union, see the following link for 
more information: http://www.oecd.org/g20/about.htm, (Accessed: 2015-10-14). 
71 Addressing base erosion and profit shifting, pp. 8, 16. 
72 Figure 2.1 in Addressing base erosion and profit shifting, p. 16. 
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risk allocation and economic substance, i.e. the managerial capacity to control 
risks and the financial capacity to bear risks.73 Due to the complexity of 
BEPS, the OECD suggests an internationally co-ordinated approach in order 
to protect tax bases. The BEPS Report encourages all stakeholders, especially 
G20 economies, to participate and proposes the delivery of an action plan that 
identifies the necessary actions to address BEPS.74  
 
As promised on July 19, 2013, the OECD issued a second report, Action plan 
on base erosion and profit shifting (Action Plan). In the Action Plan, the 
OECD recognizes the need for new international standards, realignment of 
taxation and relevant substance, increased transparency, and greater 
predictability for business. As a result, the OECD proposes fifteen action 
points and Action 13 focuses on enhancing transparency for tax 
administrations while simultaneously reconsidering the compliance costs for 
MNEs. Furthermore, the Action Plan advocates implementing a common 
template that presents information on MNE’s global allocation of income, 
economic activity, and taxes paid among countries. This common template is 
the CbC report in later drafts. Another important component of the Action 
Plan pertains to a timeline of deliverables. The Action Plan states that the 
OECD will deliver Action 13 by September 2014 and foresees changes to 
Chapter V of the TP Guidelines, as well as recommendations for domestic 
legislation. 75 In order to meet this deadline, the OECD has issued a series of 
documents within a short time spam. The next section guides the reader 
through the steps that ultimately led to the Final Report.  
3.2 Action 13 – Re-examine transfer pricing 
documentation 
In order to understand the local and international impacts of Action 13, it 
deems necessary to analyze the development of the Final Report. Especially 
since the Discussion Draft and the Comments received on discussion draft on 
transfer pricing documentation and country-by-country reporting76 (Public 
Comments) reveal the OECD’s objectives and stakeholders concerns. The 
diagram below chronologically depicts the key documents pertaining to 
Action 13. 
 
  
                                                 
73 Addressing base erosion and profit shifting, pp. 42-43.  
74 See Executive Summary in Addressing base erosion and profit shifting, pp. 5-11.  
75 Action plan on base erosion and profit shifting, pp. 13-14, 23, 34.  
76 OECD, Comments received on discussion draft on transfer pricing documentation and 
country-by-country reporting published today, 3 March 2014, 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/comments-discussion-draft-transfer-pricing-
documentation.htm, (Accessed: 2015-10-14). [cit: Public Comments 2014]. 
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Figure 2. ACTION 13: KEY EVENTS 
 
 
In response to the Action Plan, Working Party 6 of the Committee of fiscal 
affairs (WP677) published the White paper on transfer pricing 
documentation78 (White Paper) and invited public comments to instigate a 
discussion on how to revise TPD in Chapter V of the TP Guidelines. In order 
to assess the current TPD environment, WP6 consulted with other 
international organizations that work with transfer pricing. The White Paper 
seeks to simplify taxpayer’s compliance, while simultaneously providing tax 
authorities with more relevant information. In addition, the White Paper 
acknowledges that Chapter V of the TP Guidelines has become obsolete and 
recognizes the need for an international TPD standard. Finally, the White 
Paper deduces that country specific requirements place an administrative 
burden on businesses and that tax authorities often lack a “big picture” 
perspective of the MNE group.79  
 
When reconsidering the purpose of TPD requirements, the White Paper 
identifies three objectives:  
  
                                                 
77 WP6 is responsible for the OECDs work on transfer pricing matters. See under “The Role 
of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs”, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-about.htm, 
(Accessed: 2015-10-14). 
78 OECD, White paper on transfer pricing documentation, Public consultation, OECD, 30 
July 2013, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/white-paper-transfer-pricing-
documentation.pdf, (Accessed: 2015-10-07). [cit: White paper 2013]. 
79 White paper 2013, pp. 4-12. 
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-To provide governments with the information necessary to conduct an informed 
transfer pricing risk assessment at the commencement of a tax audit; 
-To assure that taxpayers have given appropriate consideration to transfer pricing 
requirements in establishing prices and other conditions for related party transactions 
and in reporting the income derived from such transactions in their tax returns; 
-To provide governments with all of the information that they require in order to 
conduct an appropriately thorough audit of the transfer pricing practices of entities 
subject to tax in their jurisdiction.
80 
 
In order to achieve these objectives, the White Paper proposes a two-tiered 
TPD structure that resembles EUTPD81 and renames it the ‘Coordinated 
Documentation Approach’. Similar to EUTPD, the master file emulates a “big 
picture” perspective of the global business, while the local file focuses on the 
specific transactions. The White Paper concludes that a global master file 
supplies countries with relevant information in one document. In turn, this 
limits the details in the local file and ultimately alleviates the compliance 
burden. Thus, TPD provides tax authorities with the right kind of information 
and creates a culture of compliance among taxpayers.82 
  
On October 3, 2013, the OECD released a Memorandum on transfer pricing 
documentation and country by country reporting83 (Memorandum) in order 
to facilitate the development of a CbC reporting template. The Memorandum 
proposes two crucial questions:  
 
1) What information should be required in the CbC reporting template?  
2) What mechanisms should be developed for reporting and sharing CbC data?84 
 
In regards to the first question, the OECD aims at striking a balance between 
tax administrations information needs for performing risk assessments and 
taxpayers’ compliance costs for compiling the data. The Memorandum 
suggests several central themes, for example: income earned in a country, 
taxes paid by country, measures of economic activity, reporting per legal 
entity contra per country basis, and reporting currency. The second question 
concerns the OECD’s depth of guidance in addition to implementation 
measures for domestic legislation. Within these aspects, the Memorandum 
considers an information sharing system as well as confidentiality.85 
                                                 
80 White paper 2013, p. 13. In contrast to the White Paper, Chapter V of the TP Guidelines 
solely refers to taxpayer’s ‘prudent business management principles’ and neglects to identify 
specific objectives of TPD. See sub-section 2.2.1 for more details.  
81 See section 2.3. 
82 White paper 2013, pp. 19-25. See Table 1 and Table 2 in the White Paper for the specific 
contents of the proposed master file and local file.  
83 OECD, Memorandum on transfer pricing documentation and country by country 
reporting, OECD, 3 October 2013, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/memorandum-
transfer-pricing-documentation-and-country-by-country-reporting.pdf, (Accessed: 2015-10-
12). [cit: Memorandum 2013]. 
84 Memorandum 2013. 
85 Memorandum 2013. 
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Shortly thereafter, the OECD released public comments on the White Paper.86 
On behalf of the Confederation of Swedish Enterprises87, the Head of the Tax 
Policy Department, Krister Andersson88, submitted comments. He expresses 
concerns over differences between countries local TPD requirements and 
anticipates that tax administrations will interpret the master file and local file 
as a checklist. Andersson also emphasizes that Action 13 should seek to 
enable risk-assessments rather than identify low tax levels in other 
countries.89 Andersson’s comments depict one of many apprehensions 
towards a CbC template and highlight the industries concern that tax 
administrations will take advantage of the CbC report for transfer pricing 
adjustments.  
 
Then on November 13, 2013, the OECD held a public consultation on transfer 
pricing topics where the public comments to the White paper were discussed 
as well as the adoption of a CbC reporting system.90 The public consultation 
demonstrates the level of openness and the extent of interest from business, 
academia, non-governmental organizations, government officials and the 
press in these issues.  
3.2.1 Discussion Draft 
In the beginning of 2014, the OECD released a Discussion Draft for public 
consultation. In the Discussion Draft, the OECD specifically request 
comments; such as, whether the preparation of the master file should be on a 
line of business or entity wide basis.91 Since the EUTPD already applied a 
master file/local file approach to TPD, the majority of the OECD’s questions 
concentrated on the design of the CbC report.92 The OECD received nearly 
one thousand pages in Public Comments! Altogether, various stakeholders 
submitted roughly 183 comments.93  
                                                 
86 OECD, OECD publishes comments received on the White paper on transfer pricing 
documentation, 22 October 2013, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/public-
comments-white-paper-transfer-pricing-documentation.htm, (Accessed: 2015-10-13). 
[cit: OECD publishes public comments]. 
87 Visit the following link to learn more about the Confederation of Swedish Enterprises: 
http://www.svensktnaringsliv.se/english/, (Accessed: 2015-10-13). 
88 Andersson has also written an article for the Svensk Skattetidning about BEPS. For further 
reading see: Andersson, Krister: Base erosion profit shifting – a new world tax order?, 
Svensk Skattetidning, vol. 9, 2013, pp. 659-687. [cit: Andersson 2013]. 
89 Andersson, Krister: The Confederation of Swedish Enterprises Comments on the OECD 
White paper on transfer pricing documentation, Confederation of Swedish Enterprises, 30 
September 2013, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/Confederation-Swedish-
Enterprise.pdf, (Accessed 2015-10-12). [cit: Andersson, The Confederation of Swedish 
Enterprises Comments on the OECD White paper on transfer pricing documentation]. 
90 OECD, OECD consults on transfer pricing matters, 13 November 2013, 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/oecd-consults-on-transfer-pricing-matters.htm, 
(Accessed 2015-10-13). [cit: OECD consults on public transfer pricing matters]. 
91 In Sect. 20 of Action 13, Final Report 2015, p. 15, the OECD reccommends that the master 
file should provide information for the MNE as a whole; however, if justified by the 
circumstances, then the information can be provided by line of business.  
92 See Discussion draft 2014, pp. 5-6 for the specific questions. 
93 Sect. 111, BEPS – frequently asked questions. 
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The structure of the Final Report reflects the Public Comments; and therefore 
this section highlights the key aspects from the Public Comments. In addition, 
stakeholders’ apprehensions and suggestions remain relevant during the 
current implementation process and future BEPS initiatives. At the same time, 
the reader needs to remember that the majority of comments portray a critical 
perspective. 
 
One major issue in the Discussion Draft pertains to whether the CbC report 
should be a part of the master file, i.e. two-tiered TPD. The Public Comments 
unanimously propose that the CbC report be a separate component in TPD, 
i.e. three-tiered TPD including a master file, a local file, and a CbC report. 
Similar to Andersson, the Public Comments raise concerns about tax 
authorities using the CbC report for other purposes than a high-level risk 
assessment. Therefore, the Public Comments stress that the amendments to 
Chapter V of the TP Guidelines need to delineate between information needed 
for a transfer pricing risk assessment contra audit. As a means to prevent 
general information gathering, the Public Comments advocate limiting the 
amount of information in the CbC report. The Public Comments also 
postulate that the CbC report contains commercially sensitive information 
and therefore, it should remain confidential.94 An additional aspect to 
confidentiality regards the differences in what national law recognizes as 
confidential information. The following example illustrates this distinction. 
Jules AB operates in Country X and in Country Y. The domestic legislation 
in Country X classifies the CbC report as confidential information, while the 
domestic legislation in Country Y determines that the CbC report contains 
unprotected information. If Country Y discloses the CbC report, then this 
would violate the national laws in Country X. Information that would have 
otherwise been kept confidential will become publically available.95 In order 
to avoid such confidentiality conflicts, the commentaries suggest utilizing tax 
treaties and tax information exchange agreements for information sharing 
purposes.96  
 
The Public Comments also stress that the magnitude of requested information 
disproportionally increase MNE’s compliance burden. Thus, it appears that 
the Discussion Draft has lost sight of the objective of Action 13. Action 13 
seeks to, “Develop rules regarding transfer pricing documentation to enhance 
transparency for tax administration, taking into consideration the compliance 
costs for business”.97 In addition, the OECD did not consider the increase in 
costs for governments to appropriately analyze and apply the information. For 
instance, if master files contain excessive information, then the tax authorities 
must spend time understanding the provided information, regardless if it 
ultimately facilitates their transfer pricing risk assessment process.98 The 
                                                 
94 For example, see EY in Public Comments 2014, vol. 2, pp. 77-78 & KPMG in Public 
Comments 2014, vol. 3 pp. 21-26. 
95 Author’s example. 
96 For example, see EY in Public Comments 2014, vol. 2, p. 88 & KPMG in Public Comments 
2014, vol. 3, p. 26.  
97 Action plan on base erosion and profit shifting, p. 23. 
98 For example, see Deloitte in Public Comments 2014, vol. 2, pp. 6-7. 
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main point pierces through; more information places excessive burdens on 
both taxpayers and tax authorities. Instead, the focus needs to be on relevant 
information that the tax authorities can apply when they conduct risk 
assessments.99   
 
Finally, the Public Comments express concerns about how CbC reporting 
represents a step toward formulary apportionment.100 In contrast to the arm’s 
length principle, global formulary apportionment101 allocates the MNE’s 
global profits between countries based on a formula. Some believe that 
formulary apportionment deems necessary in order to combat BEPS behavior, 
since it represents a multilateral solution.102 However, the TP Guidelines 
disregard the global formulary apportionment system and explicitly state the 
superiority of the arm’s length principle.103 At the News Conference for the 
launch of the final BEPS reports, the Director of the OECD’s center for Tax 
Policy and Administration, Pascal Saint-Amans, explains that the formulary 
apportionment system is still too hypothetical and deems more suitable for 
academic research. He postulates that not a single country wants formulary 
apportionment and utilizes the EU’s struggle with implementing a common 
consolidated corporation tax base104 (CCCTB) as an example. Saint-Amans 
assures the public that the arm’s length principle works in the majority of 
cases and that the OECD has fixed the TP Guidelines. In conclusion, the 
OECD will only consider alternative approaches if the amendments to the TP 
Guidelines fail to combat BEPS.105  
3.2.2 Public disclosure 
The previous sub-section has presented criticism from a practitioner’s 
perspective. This sub-section highlights the academic discourse over whether 
CbC reporting should be disclosed to the public from three unique viewpoints. 
The first perspective values securing public trust and finds public disclosure 
necessary for the success of the BEPS project. The second perspective 
provides a cost-benefit analysis of CbC reporting and proposes a stronger 
enforcement of transfer pricing rules. Finally, the third perspective focuses on 
the intercorporate consequences of disclosing CbC reporting.  
 
  
                                                 
99 Author’s comment. 
100 For example, see EY in Public Comments 2014, vol. 2, p. 78 & Deloitte in Public 
Comments 2014, vol. 2, p. 12 & KPMG in Public Comments 2014, vol. 3, p. 25. 
101 “In a system of formulary apportionment the share of profits of a multinational group that 
each country may tax is determined not by looking at the accounts of companies operating in 
each country but by dividing out the total global profits of the group according to a formula.” 
See Miller & Oats 2014, p. 395.  
102 Miller & Oats 2014, p. 568. Professor of Law, Yariv Brauner, at the University of Florida 
is also a proponent of formulary apportionment. For further reading see: Brauner, Yariv: 
Formula based transfer pricing, Intertax, vol. 42, no. 10, 2014, pp. 615-631. 
[cit: Brauner 2014, Formula based transfer pricing]. 
103 Paragraph 1.16-1.31 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 2010. 
104 For further reading about the common consolidated corporation tax base see, Miller & 
Oats 2014, pp. 590-602. CCCTB within the EU will be discussed in sub-section 4.3.3.  
105 News Conference 2015. 
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University of Florida Research Foundation Professor, Yariv Brauner106, 
presupposes that CbC reporting goes beyond the scope of transfer pricing. 
Therefore, he believes that CbC reporting belongs to Action 11- Measuring 
and monitoring BEPS107 instead of Action 13. From Professor Brauner’s 
perspective, CbC reporting improves compliance, restores public trust, and 
encourages legitimacy. However, he considers that achieving these objectives 
depends on whether the OECD makes CbC reporting publically available. 
Professor Brauner disagrees with taxpayers and tax authorities arguments 
against CbC reporting. He motivates that the type of information in the CbC 
report does not affect the competitive position of taxpayers. In addition, 
Professor Brauner finds it disheartening that the tax authorities claim that the 
information in CbC reporting would be redundant. Such a claim infers that 
the tax authorities already have the information they need, but refrain from 
acting upon it. Lastly, Professor Brauner predicts that CbC reporting will help 
develop more effective multilateral instruments.108  
 
In contrast, researchers from the University of Mannheim question the 
application of CbC reporting as a means for combatting profit shifting. They 
argue that the costs of CbC reporting outweigh the benefits. The researchers 
identify several types of disclosure costs. First, MNEs bear the initial cost of 
setting up the appropriate system that can extract the right data for CbC 
reporting. In addition, MNEs endure direct reporting costs associated with 
maintaining the CbC report on a year-to-year basis. The researchers believe 
that the public disclosure of CbC reporting would release commercial 
sensitive information and incur competitive disadvantages. They also 
anticipate an upswing of double taxation and fear that tax administrations will 
misinterpret the disclosed information. On the other hand, the researchers also 
identify several benefits of CbC reporting. For example, CbC reporting 
encourages taxpayers to pay taxes based on their economic activity, enhances 
administrative efficiency, supports capital markets, and modifies customers 
buyer behavior. However, these expected benefits of CbC reporting depend 
on hypothetical results. For instance, there does not appear to be a direct 
correlation between the disclosure of more information and a decrease in tax 
aggressive behavior. Based on empirical evidence, the researchers postulate 
that enforcing stricter transfer pricing rules reduces tax aggressive 
behavior.109   
                                                 
106 The author had the pleasure of attending Professor Brauner’s presentation, Should we 
abandon the “arm’s length” concept?, at the Transfer Pricing Tax Conference at 
Copenhagen Business School on November 4, 2015. In summary, Professor Brauner 
criticizes the OECD for not reconsidering an alternative to the arm’s length principle.  
107 If you would like to read the final report see, Action 11, Final Report 2015. 
108 Brauner, Yariv: What the BEPS?, Florida Tax Review, vol. 16, no. 2, 2014, pp. 55-115. 
[cit: Brauner 2014, What the BEPS?], pp. 105-106, 114-115. 
109 Evers, Maria Theresia & Meier, Ina & Spengel, Christoph: Transparency in financial 
reporting: is country-by-country reporting suitable to combat international profit shifting?, 
Bulletin for International Taxation, Journals IBFD, 2014, pp. 295-303.  
[cit: Evers, et al 2014], pp. 300-303. 
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In the article, Reconsidering corporate tax privacy110, Professor of Tax 
Practice, Joshua D. Blank, at New York University School of Law, examines 
the ‘intercorporate perspective’ of tax privacy and tax compliance. Professor 
Blank analyzes how the privacy of tax returns in the United States affects 
corporate tax aggressiveness. He claims that public disclosure of tax returns 
could exacerbate aggressive tax planning, since it makes quantitative data that 
would otherwise be confidential readily available. Consequently, accounting 
firms could establish benchmarks, tax directors could reverse engineer 
strategies, and stakeholders could place pressure on boards. Professor Blank 
also makes specific comments about the confidentiality of the master file and 
the CbC report in the new TPD package Action 13 proposes that countries 
implement. Professor Blank warns that public access to CbC reporting 
disperses knowledge about which geographic regions corporations are 
operating in and discloses valuable tax information that competitors could 
take advantage of. He reminds us that corporations select to operate in 
jurisdictions for other reasons than tax avoidance. For example, the selected 
jurisdiction might have preferable corporate laws, better labor standards, or 
access to specific natural resources. Blank stresses the importance of 
considering all the consequences of increased awareness and opens the 
possibility of public disclosure leading to an increase in profit shifting.111   
 
In the Final Report, the OECD recommends that all documents in TPD remain 
confidential and reinforces the importance of ensuring confidentiality.112 A 
more analytical discussion about confidentiality continues in section 5.2. The 
last sub-section studies the initial Swedish doctrinal responses to the OECD’s 
next report, Guidance on transfer pricing documentation and country-by-
country reporting, which contains an updated version of Chapter V of the TP 
Guidelines. 
3.2.3 Guidance on transfer pricing documentation and 
CbC reporting 
Transfer Pricing Specialist, Roberth Glansberg, at the SKV published an 
article113 that clarifies the OECD’s report, Guidance on transfer pricing 
documentation and country-by-country reporting. He shares several intrinsic 
observations and reflects over the implications the updated Chapter V endures 
on MNEs and the SKV. First, he notes that the revisions provide intricate 
guidelines, increase MNE’s information burden, and present a new way to 
compose TPD. For example, the updated Chapter V includes a standardized 
three-tiered TPD package, including a master file, a local file, and a CbC 
report. Glansberg emphasizes that the master file provides the tax authorities 
with a high-level overview of the MNE, while the local file complements the 
master file with specific transactions between the related entities. Together 
                                                 
110 Blank, D. Joshua: Reconsidering corporate tax privacy, New York University Journal of 
Law and Business, vol. 11, no. 1, 2014, pp. 31-121. [cit: Blank 2014]. 
111 Blank 2014, pp.  37-39, 105-109. 
112 Sect. 44 in Action 13, Final Report 2015, p. 19. 
113 Glansberg, Roberth: Vägledning för internprissättningsdokumentation och land för land- 
rapportering, Svensk Skattetidning, vol.10, 2014, pp. 794-802. [cit: Glansberg 2014]. 
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the master file and local file serve as a foundation for the tax authorities 
transfer pricing adjustment. In order to detect high-risk areas and perform risk 
assessments, the CbC report represents the third component of TPD. In 
contrast to the master file and local file, the CbC report does not create 
grounds for a transfer pricing adjustment. Thus, the updated Chapter V 
encompasses more information about the specific content of TPD in addition 
to the CbC report.114  
 
Professor Hultqvist expands on Glansberg’s article in Kommentar till Action 
13 – TP dokumentation115 and recognizes several themes in the OECD’s 
recommendations, such as: transparency, standardization, information 
exchange, and confidentiality. Indeed, CbC reporting allows tax authorities 
to gain access to MNEs operations in different countries and therefore, 
Professor Hultqvist perceives a need for reconsidering confidentiality. If 
taxpayers send in more information to tax authorities, then there needs to be 
insurance that the information remains confidential. The updated Chapter V 
also substantially increases MNE’s information burden; thereby, supplying 
tax authorities with more concrete arguments for transfer pricing adjustments. 
From Professor Hultqvist’s perspective, the updated Chapter V gives tax 
authorities the upper hand over MNEs. At the same time, transfer pricing 
regulations strive to avoid double taxation. Figuratively speaking, there is 
only one cake to share between jurisdictions and transfer pricing signifies a 
tool for how jurisdictions can divide the cake. Professor Hultqvist points out 
that the updated Chapter V does not infer that all jurisdictions will get a larger 
piece of cake; instead, some will get more and some will get less.116  
 
Undeniably, MNEs run the risk of an increase in double taxation (even triple 
taxation), more disputes with tax authorities and high litigation costs.117 The 
next section presents the key aspects of the Final Report. The specific 
contents of the master file, local file, and CbC report will not be discussed in 
detail, since this is more of an issue for practitioners. After all, every business 
area has unique attributes that this thesis cannot account for; yet, the OECD 
advocates standardized documentation, i.e. a ‘one-size fits all’ approach.  
3.3 Final Report 
Ultimately, the OECD follows some of the Public Comments or at least, 
stakeholders can consider it a compromise. During the launch of the BEPS 
2015 Final Reports Technical Presentation, the Head of Tax Treaty, Transfer 
Pricing and Financial Transactions Division, Marlies de Ruiter, informed us 
                                                 
114 Glansberg 2014, pp. 794-802.  
115 Hultqvist, Anders: Kommentar till Action 13 – TP dokumentation, Svensk Skattetidning, 
vol. 10, 2014, pp. 803-806. [cit: Hultqvist 2014]. 
116 Hultqvist 2014, pp.803-805. 
117 The OECD has also further developed the mutual agreement procedure to minimize the 
risks of unintended double taxation. Please see the following report for further reading: 
OECD, Making dispute resolution mechanisms more effective, Action 14- 2015 Final Report, 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241633-en, (Accessed: 2015-10-12).  
[cit: Action 14, Final Report 2015]. 
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that the Final Report encompasses the three previous reports118 pertaining to 
Action 13 and contains no new guidance, with the exception of the executive 
summary.119 This exemplifies the strong consensus and political commitment 
by all members to align to the contents of the Final Report, especially the 
implementation of CbC reporting.120 Even though the OECD intends to 
release an updated version of the TP Guidelines in 2017121, the Final Report 
states that, “The text of Chapter V of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines is 
deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following language and 
annexes”.122 This means that countries can already implement and apply the 
updated Chapter V. 
 
The remainder of section 3.3 is organized accordingly. First, sub-section 3.3.1 
provides a brief overview of the updated Chapter V in the Final Report. The 
following sub-section elaborates on the Model legislation related to Country-
by-Country Reporting123 (Model Legislation). When reading sub-section 
3.3.2 it is crucial to bear in mind that this represents model legislation. This 
infers that countries individually choose the extent of and timeframe for 
adopting the OECD’s recommendations. Sub-section 3.3.3 concludes with 
several international observations over the expected implementation of the 
master file, local file, and CbC report. 
3.3.1 Chapter V of the Transfer pricing guidelines on 
documentation  
The updated Chapter V solidifies three objectives of TPD:   
 
1) to ensure that taxpayers give appropriate consideration to transfer pricing 
requirements in establishing prices and other conditions for transactions between 
associated enterprises and in reporting the income derived from such transactions in 
their tax returns; 
2) to provide tax administrations with the information necessary to conduct an informed 
transfer pricing risk assessment; and 
3) to provide tax administrations with useful information to employ in conducting an 
appropriately thorough audit of the transfer pricing practices of entities subject to tax 
in their jurisdiction, although it may be necessary to supplement the documentation 
with additional information as the audit progresses.124  
 
The revised objectives of TPD exemplify the focus on proportionality and 
relevant information. In comparison to the White Paper, the Final report 
                                                 
118 Guidance on transfer pricing documentation and country-by-country reporting, Guidance 
on the implementation of transfer pricing documentation and country-by-country reporting, 
Country-by-country reporting implementation package. 
119 Technical Presentation 2015. 
120 The G20 finance ministers endorsed the BEPS final package on October 9, 2015. Visit the 
following website for more information: http://www.oecd.org/tax/g20-finance-ministers-
endorse-reforms-to-the-international-tax-system-for-curbing-avoidance-by-multinational-
enterprises.htm. (Accessed 2015-11-16). 
121 Sect. 115, BEPS – frequently asked questions. 
122 Action 13, Final Report 2015, p. 11. 
123 Action 13, Final Report 2015, pp. 39-43. 
124 Sect. 5 in Action 13, Final Report 2015, p. 12. The cursive sections demonstrate the 
amendments in comparison to the White Paper. 
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deletes, “at the commencement of a tax audit” from the second point. Another 
interesting change regards the order of the tax objectives. The taxpayer’s 
compliance objective comes first instead of second; which suggests that the 
primary purpose of TPD is for MNEs to reflect over their compliance with 
the arm’s length principle.125 To summarize, the three objectives are about 
taxpayers’ compliance with the arm’s length principle and tax administrations 
transfer pricing risk assessment and transfer pricing audit. These three 
objectives of TPD establish a foundation for the development of domestic 
rules. In order to meet these objectives, the OECD commends a standardized 
TPD approach with a three-tiered structure, including a master file, a local 
file, and a CbC report. The OECD expects that this new approach to TPD will 
identify transfer pricing risks and facilitate tax administration’s transfer 
pricing risk assessments.126  
 
In the updated Chapter V, Annex I and II disclose the contents of the master 
file respective local file, Annex III provides a model CbC template, and 
Annex IV contains an implementation package.127 Since the CbC report 
embodies a new addition to previous TPD formats128 and signifies the most 
invasive amendment, a more detailed explanation of the CbC report 
exemplifies the extensiveness of the new recommendations. Supplement A 
shows the CbC report, which contains three tables. Table 1 shows an 
overview of allocation of income, taxes and business activities by tax 
jurisdiction, Table 2 lists all of the constituent entities of the MNE group 
included in each aggregation per tax jurisdiction, and Table 3 requests 
additional information. Table 3129 provides an opportunity for the MNE to 
disclose any further information that would assist the tax administration’s 
understanding of the information provided in the CbC report.130    
 
The updated Chapter V explicitly explains how the CbC template should not 
be used. For instance, the CbC report does not substitute a detailed transfer 
pricing analysis nor does it provide sound evidence for a transfer pricing 
adjustment. Most importantly, it should not be used as a basis to calculate 
transfer pricing adjustments based on a global formulary apportionment of 
income. Instead, CbC reporting expedites transfer pricing risk assessments 
and helps to evaluate other BEPS-related risks.131 The fact that the OECD 
permits the usage of the CbC report for other BEPS related risks unleashes 
doubts about if any boundaries truly exist. The OECD claims that the data 
                                                 
125 Author’s reflections. 
126 Action 13, Final Report 2015, pp. 12-14. 
127 Action 13, Final Report 2015, pp. 25-69. Kindly observe that the revised Chap.1, Sect. D, 
of the TP Guidelines provides complimentary guidance on factors to be included in the master 
file and information about the economically relevant characteristics of the actual transactions 
to be included in the local file. See Sects. 1.34-1.36 in Actions 8-10 Final Reports 2015, pp. 
15-16. 
128 For example the EUTPD utilizes a master file/local file approach.  
129 Tax consultants as well as the SKV have distinctly pointed out the importance of taking 
advantage of Table 3 in order to clarify the implications of the CbC report. 
130 Please see Action 13, Final Report 2015, pp. 31-35 for the OECD’s general instructions 
and specific instructions about how to fill out the CbC report. 
131 Sect. 25 in Action 13, Final Report 2015, p. 16. 
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permits governments and qualified researchers to perform economical and 
statistical research as a measure to improve future analyses of BEPS.132 The 
next sub-section presents the OECD’s guidance on the implementation of 
TPD and CbC reporting.      
3.3.2 Implementation package 
In the Final Report, the OECD recommends that countries domestically 
implement the master file and local file components of TPD based on their 
legal procedures.133 This allows individual countries to define material 
thresholds for local file purposes, as well as the timing for filing. Material 
thresholds can be based on local factors, such as the local economy’s market 
place, or on the size of the MNE group. Implementing material thresholds 
limits MNE’s compliance burden, while emphasizing the most significant 
transactions for transfer pricing purposes.134 Pertaining to the filing of TPD, 
the updated Chapter V proposes a best practice135, which entails that the local 
file should be finalized by the due date for the filing of the relevant tax return. 
Similarly, the master file should be finalized when the ultimate parent entity 
of the MNE group submits their tax return. The OECD recognizes that MNEs 
need more time to compile the information for the CbC report and therefore, 
the provisions recommend that the filing of the CbC report be extended to one 
year following the last day of the fiscal year of the ultimate parent entity of 
the MNE group.136  
 
In Annex IV, the OECD provides Model Legislation, which suggests how 
CbC reporting should be implemented into domestic legislation. The Final 
Report recommends that the filing of the first CbC reports begin on or after 
January 1, 2016.   Since MNEs receive one year from the close of the fiscal 
year to prepare and file the CbC report, December 31, 2017, is considered the 
earliest the first CbC reports will be filed. Furthermore, the Final Report 
advises that countries only require MNE groups with annual consolidated 
group revenue over EUR 750 million to file CbC reporting. The 
recommended threshold excludes 85 to 90 percent of MNE groups, while 
encompassing approximately 90 percent of corporate revenues.137 At the 
Press Conference, Saint-Amans clarifies that the EUR 750 million reporting 
threshold effectively targets core business activity, while only 10 percent of 
companies. Otherwise, tax administrations would be drowned in CbC 
reporting. Finally, Saint-Amans reiterates that the OECD will review the 
effectiveness of the turnover threshold of EUR 750 million during 2020.138  
 
It lies outside the scope of this thesis to analyze the government exchange of 
CbC reporting; however, understanding the dynamics of the CbC report filing 
                                                 
132 Sect. 71, BEPS - frequently asked questions.  
133 Sects. 48-62 in Action 13, Final Report 2015, pp. 20-23.  
134 Sects. 32-34 in Action 13, Final Report 2015, p. 17. 
135 Best practice means that a jurisdiction can implement the provisions if they want to. See 
even Sect. 4, BEPS – frequently asked questions.  
136 Sects. 29-31 in Action 13, Final Report 2015, pp. 16-17. 
137 Sects. 50-53 in Action 13, Final Report 2015, pp. 20-21. 
138 News Conference 2015.  
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obligation plays a key role in the case study in section 5.1. The Model 
Legislation stipulates a filing obligation in Article 2. Primarily, the ‘Ultimate 
Parent Entity’139 of the MNE group files the CbC report to the entity’s 
jurisdiction of tax residence. In the case that the jurisdiction of the Ultimate 
Parent Entity does not require CbC reporting, then a secondary mechanism 
becomes applicable instead. The secondary mechanism permits local filing of 
the CbC report by a resident subsidiary in the relevant jurisdiction. If there 
are multiple subsidiaries in the same jurisdiction, then the MNE group can 
assign a constituent entity to locally file CbC reporting on behalf of the MNE 
group’s subsidiaries in that jurisdiction. According to the secondary 
mechanism, MNEs also have the option to appoint a ‘Surrogate Parent 
Entity’140 which substitutes the Ultimate Parent Entity. This appointment 
allows the Surrogate Parent Entity to file the CbC report to the entity’s 
jurisdiction of tax residence on behalf of the MNE group under the following 
conditions: the jurisdiction of tax residence of the Surrogate Parent Entity 
requires CbC filing and that jurisdiction has a Qualifying Competent 
Authority Agreement. In addition, the Surrogate Parent Entity’s jurisdiction 
has to be properly notified about the Surrogate Parent Entity and cannot have 
systematic failure.141  
 
Lastly, the OECD praises consistency and a timely implementation of 
domestic legislation. Consistency involves utilizing the standard template and 
requiring the Ultimate Parent Entity to file the CbC report.142 In addition, the 
OECD mandates countries participating in the BEPS project to assess the 
implementation of BEPS and to provide feedback by the end of 2020.143 The 
last sub-section presents an international perspective over how countries plan 
to implement the new TPD requirements domestically. 
3.3.3 Local implementation 
Due to the confinements of this thesis, the author could not analyze the current 
or expected legislative or authoritative amendments in all the countries that 
have committed to the BEPS project. Fortunately, EY’s Global Tax Desks 
conducted a survey144 with all OECD countries and many non-OECD 
                                                 
139 According to Article 1.6 of the Model Legislation, ‘Ultimate Parent Entity’ corresponds 
to the constituent entity in the MNE group who is required to prepare consolidated financial 
statements. See Action 13, Final Report 2015, pp. 39-40.  
140 According to Article 1.7 of the Model Legislation, ‘Surrogate Parent Entity’ substitutes 
the ultimate parent entity and files the CbC report to its jurisdiction of tax residence on behalf 
of the MNE group. See Action 13, Final Report 2015, p. 40.  
141 Action 13, Final Report 2015, pp. 39-41. See even Sects. 60-62 in Action 13, Final Report 
2015, p. 23.  
142 Sect. 58 & 62 in Action 13, Final Report 2015, pp. 22-23. 
143 Action 13, Final Report 2015, p. 10. 
144 EY, Country implementation of BEPS Actions 8-10 and 13 – A survey on the 
implementation of the BEPS Actions on transfer pricing and transfer pricing documentation, 
August 2015,  http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-country-implementation-of-
beps-actions-8-10-and-13-august-2015/$FILE/ey-country-implementation-of-beps-actions-
8-10-and-13.pdf, (Accessed: 2015-09-24). 
[cit: Country implementation of BEPS Actions 8-10 and 13]. 
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countries145 that analyzes the dynamics of implementing Actions 8-10 – 
Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation (Actions 8-10) and 
Action 13 in local countries. Even though EY published the survey prior to 
the publication of the Final Report, the survey still provides meaningful 
insight about how fast the new three-tiered TPD requirements can enter into 
effect. Since Actions 8-10 are outside the domain of this thesis, the following 
focuses on the survey’s results regarding Action 13.  
 
The surveys first question asks, “Can local tax authorities implement the 
OECD standard master file/local file/CbC reporting requirements without 
legislative action?”146 First, EY distinguishes between countries that require 
formal legislative action from those where the tax authorities can 
independently extend their scope of interpretation. In addition, EY 
differentiates between situations where the tax authorities request information 
ad hoc, from situations where taxpayers must fulfil a tax compliance 
obligation. Prior to the Final Report, none of the countries surveyed required 
such intricate information from taxpayers. Thus, in the majority of surveyed 
countries, enforcing three-tiered TPD requires legislative changes. In some 
cases, the tax authorities have already been requesting information that 
corresponds to the guidance from the BEPS Project. EY postulates that, 
“…the general rule of thumb is that tax authorities can request any 
information that is foreseeably relevant to the local country tax base and 
reasonably available to the taxpayer”.147 This implies that tax authorities 
generally have a flexible margin for the type of information they can request 
from taxpayers. EY and this author believe that Action 13 enhances tax 
authorities’ arguments for what constitutes ‘foreseeably relevant’ 
information.148 
 
The following two questions in the survey isolate implementing the master 
file/local file TPD requirement from CbC reporting. In regards to the 
implementation of the master file/local file TPD requirement, EY reveals that 
the majority of countries require legislative amendments. This reflection 
infers that in the majority of countries surveyed the law itself stipulates the 
contents of TPD. Of the OECD countries that already have TPD 
requirements, 82% conceive that legislative action is necessary. In respect to 
CbC reporting, only 6% of OECD countries report that CbC reporting does 
not require legislative amendments. As a result, a clear minority of OECD 
country’s tax authorities have the authorization to implement a master file, a 
local file, and a CbC report.149    
 
In addition, the survey assesses if any constitutional obstacles prevent the 
implementation of Action 13. The results reveal the possibility of 
constitutional conflicts when tax authorities request information that the local 
                                                 
145  See page 20 in Country implementation of BEPS Actions 8-10 and 13 for a full list of all 
the countries surveyed.  
146 Country implementation of BEPS Actions 8-10 and 13, p. 6. 
147 Country implementation of BEPS Actions 8-10 and 13, p. 6. 
148 Country implementation of BEPS Actions 8-10 and 13, p. 6. 
149 Country implementation of BEPS Actions 8-10 and 13, pp. 8-9, 10-11. 
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taxpayer cannot access. Finally, the survey displays a map over which 
countries are expected to implement CbC reporting and unsurprisingly, 
Sweden is one of them.150 This thesis agrees with EY’s hypothesis, since 
Sweden generally follows the OECD’s recommendations.    
 
In response to the Final Reports, EY publicized an educational webcast151 to 
explain the new TPD requirements. The presentation includes a diagram, 
which the reader can find in Supplement B. The diagram in Supplement B 
illustrates the international development of the local implementation of 
Action 13. The diagram gives the reader some perspective over which 
countries have or are implementing CbC reporting as of October 2015, but it 
is not an exhaustive list of countries. The diagram also distinctly demonstrates 
that differences exist between how countries implement the provisions in 
Action 13. For example, only Denmark and the Netherlands opt to incorporate 
filing by a Surrogate Parent Entity, while the UK chooses to adopt voluntary 
local filing. A failure with these coordination attempts implies that tax 
policies between different countries may differ; thereby, creating a diffuse 
situation for MNEs. The case study in section 5.1 explores the practical 
impact of Action 13 in further detail.  
3.4 Summary 
To summarize, the BEPS project seeks to develop new international standards 
that inhibit double non-taxation and the shifting of profits to low-tax 
jurisdictions. The OECD identifies three central goals within the Action Plan: 
coherence, substance, and transparency. Action 13, the focus of this thesis, is 
about enhancing transparency for the tax authorities. In order to achieve this 
purpose, WP6 identifies that the guidance on TPD, specifically Chapter V of 
the TP Guidelines, necessitates modifications. The Public Comments raise 
apprehensions about MNE’s information burden, the confidentiality of 
commercially sensitive information, and the risks of moving towards 
formulary apportionment.  
 
The updated Chapter V of the TP Guidelines recommends three-tiered TPD, 
including a master file, a local file, and a CbC report. In particular, CbC 
reporting has received additional attention and can be perceived as a 
monumental change in international taxation. In fact, the extensiveness of 
CbC reporting could possibly outweigh the expected benefits. Professor 
Brauner believes that the effectiveness of CbC reporting is contingent on 
making it publically available; while Professor Blank hypothesizes that public 
disclosure would only intensify aggressive tax planning and ultimately, 
increase BEPS. Even though all aspects of TPD are presently confidential, 
the OECD plans to readdress CbC reporting in 2020 and changes are 
                                                 
150 Country implementation of BEPS Actions 8-10 and 13, pp. 12, 16-17. 
151 EY, OECD BEPS project outcomes: New reporting under Action 13, EY Global Tax 
Webcast, 20 October 2015, http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Issues/webcast_2015-10-20-
1400_oecd-beps-project-outcomes-new-reporting-under-action-13, (Accessed: 2015-11-05). 
[cit: New reporting under Action 13]. The webcast can be publically accessed until October 
20, 2016. 
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expected. Finally, a survey published by EY illustrates that most countries 
require legislative amendments to enforce three-tiered TPD. In addition, 
countries have started implementing new TPD rules and differences in CbC 
reporting are already apparent. After gaining an international perspective, the 
next chapter focuses solely on TPD in Sweden.   
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4 Transfer pricing documentation in 
Sweden 
Chapter 4 begins with a study of the initial responses to the 2007 
implementation of Swedish TPD requirements, with an emphasis on SKVFS 
2007:1.152 Concerns at the time remain relevant in light of the updated 
Chapter V, which allows the author to draw parallels between the Swedish 
doctrine and the updated Chapter V. Based on the SKV’s report153, section 
4.2 evaluates the effectivity of the Swedish transfer pricing rules. Chapter 4 
concludes with a prognosis about the implementation of the updated Chapter 
V of the TP Guidelines in the Swedish legal system.  
4.1 Pre BEPS- relevant information and 
proportionality 
The 2007 implementation of TPD legislation in Sweden led to an array of 
articles from tax practitioners, advisors, and professors. During 2007 the 
Swedish doctrine focuses on proportionality and what constitutes relevant 
information. Sect. 2 of the SKVFS 2007:1 specifically states that:  
 
The information that shall be included in the documentation pursuant to Sections 3-9 
shall make it possible to assess whether pricing and other terms and conditions applied 
in intra-group transactions are in accordance with the arm’s length principle. The 
documentation only needs to contain information which is necessary to make a 
reasonable assessment in these respects.154  
 
Thus, Sect. 2 of the SKVFS 2007:1 articulates the principle of proportionality 
when stating that documentation only needs to contain the necessary 
information for an assessment. The broadness of the SKV’s regulations opens 
the door for subjective interpretations by both taxpayers and the SKV. As 
mentioned in section 2.4, Prop. 2005/06:169 states that the provided 
information should permit the SKV to perform a transfer pricing 
assessment.155 Yet, the question remains, what constitutes relevant 
information? It is in light of what constitutes relevant information that the 
SKV delivered SKV M 2007:25. For instance, SKV M 2007:25 clarifies the 
meaning of relevant financial information and explains that turnover, gross 
profit, and operating profit signify basic financial information that should be 
included in TPD.156  
 
Krister Andersson from the Swedish Industry and tax expert, Margareta 
Leijonhufvud, focus on the meaning of proportionality in the new regulations. 
They both emphasize that TPD increases enterprises costs and that this cost 
                                                 
152 See section 2.4 for an overview of the Swedish transfer pricing rules.  
153 Skatteverkets rapport 2014-10-13. 
154 This is the SKV’s English translation of the regulation.  
155 Prop. 2005/06:169 p. 103.  
156 SKV M 2007:25 pp. 10-11.  
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needs to be in proportion to the SKV’s usage of the disclosed information.157 
According to Sects. 11-12 of the SKVFS 2007:1, enterprises only need to 
compile and submit TPD upon the SKV’s request. Since the SKV does not 
enforce contemporaneous documentation, Andersson perceives that these 
stipulations demonstrate the principle of proportionality in SKVFS 2007:1.158 
On the other hand, Leijonhufvud expresses concerns about the amount and 
complexity of the documentation required and the corresponding increase in 
costs for enterprises.159 Intriguingly, a similar balance between taxpayers 
costs and tax authorities usage of the information, underscores the updated 
Chapter V. For example, the updated Chapter V explicitly states that, “An 
important overarching consideration in developing such rules is to balance 
the usefulness of the data to tax administrations for transfer pricing risk 
assessment and other purposes with any increased compliance burdens placed 
on taxpayers”.160  
 
Professor Emeritus Lodin, whom was also involved in the publishing of the 
1995 TP Guidelines, published a debate article161 in the Svensk Skattetidning 
that responds to an article162 written by EY tax professionals, Mikael Hall and 
Olov Persson. He reminds us that the Swedish legislation does not require 
MNEs to send in their TPD to the SKV annually.163 In addition, the SKV 
maintains the burden of proof even if the MNE submits insufficient TPD. 
Professor Emeritus Lodin reflects that MNEs especially need to work with 
their transfer pricing if they operate in a jurisdiction with stricter TPD 
requirements. Therefore, he hypothesizes that large MNEs have been 
intrinsically completing TPD before the 2007 Swedish implementation. 
Nevertheless, he notices that the new Swedish TPD requirements attract more 
attention to transfer pricing issues. Finally, Professor Emeritus Lodin 
reiterates that the TP Guidelines build upon a reasonable assessment of that 
transfer prices adhere to the arm’s length principle and advises from seeing 
TPD as a one-time fix all solution.164 
 
Professor Emeritus Lodin, Hall, and Persson agree that MNEs need to work 
continuously with well-documented transfer pricing. Yet, their views diverge 
on the extent in which a MNE needs to be prepared with documentation. 
According to Sect. 11 of the SKVFS 2007:1, enterprises need routines for 
compiling TPD upon the SKV’s request. Professor Emeritus Lodin advocates 
                                                 
157 Leijonhufvud, Margareta: Dokumentationskrav vid internprissättning, Svensk 
Skattetidning, vol. 2, 2007, pp. 138-141. [cit: Leijonhufvud 2007], pp. 139-140.  
Andersson, Krister: Skatteverkets föreskrifter om dokumentation av prissättning mellan 
företag i intressegemenskap, Svensk Skattetidning, vol. 2,  2007, pp. 142-146.  
[cit: Andersson 2007], pp. 142-143. 
158 Andersson 2007, p. 143. 
159 Leijonhufvud 2007, p. 140. 
160 Sect. 4 in Final Report 2015, p. 11.  
161 Lodin 2007. 
162 Hall, Mikael & Persson, Olov: Dokumentationsskyldighet avseende internprissättning, 
Svensk Skattetidning, vol. 2, 2007, pp. 147-156.  
[cit: Hall & Persson 2007, Dokumentationsskyldighet]. 
163 Sect. 12 of the SKVFS 2007:1 states that, ”The documentation shall be submitted to the 
Swedish Tax Agency at the request of the Agency.” 
164 Lodin 2007, pp. 315-318. 
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that it will be sufficient for enterprises to have an organized system with their 
transfer pricing policy and accounting. This allows MNEs to extract the 
required data upon the SKV’s request.165 On the contrary, Hall and Persson 
recommend that enterprises proactively work with their transfer pricing 
policy on a continuous basis to guarantee consensus with the arm’s length 
principle.166 At the least, enterprises should abide by the arm’s length 
principle and document their transfer pricing principles when entering into 
intra-group transactions. It is difficult to determine the timeframe for when a 
MNE needs to progress with the formal evaluation of their intra-group 
transactions; thereby, preparing a formalized transfer pricing policy and TPD. 
In order to avoid transfer pricing adjustments, Hall and Persson recommend 
that MNEs have a well-documented transfer pricing policy that coheres with 
the arm’s length principle. In addition, the conduct of the parties in the intra-
group transactions should reflect the MNE group’s transfer pricing policy.167 
 
In the introduction of the updated Chapter V of the TP Guidelines, the OECD 
acknowledges problems within the same topics – relevant information and 
proportionality. The OECD notices a lack of balance between the costs of 
composing TPD and the tax authorities’ usefulness of the information. In fact, 
taxpayers’ compliance costs continue to increase, even though tax 
administrations often find TPD inadequate for their risk assessments. The 
OECD contends that the 2010 version of Chapter V neglects to elaborate on 
the specific content of TPD and consequently countries have adopted their 
own TPD requirements in a non-harmonized fashion.168 Now the updated 
Chapter V concretely outlines what information needs to be included in the 
master file and local file.169 The OECD reiterates that together, the master 
file, local file, and CbC report, “…balance tax administration information 
needs, concerns about inappropriate use of the information, and the 
compliance costs and burdens imposed on business”.170 Accordingly, Chapter 
V intends to create more balance by issuing additional guidance for taxpayers 
and tax administrations. In respect to what constitutes relevant information in 
the master file, the updated Chapter V clarifies that information is relevant if 
its omission would deter from the reliability of the transfer pricing 
outcomes.171 It is too soon to tell if the updated Chapter V actually addresses 
proportionality and simplifies relevant information in practice.  
  
                                                 
165 Lodin 2007, p. 316. 
166 Hall & Persson 2007, Dokumentationsskyldighet, p. 155. 
167 Hall, Mikael & Persson, Olov: En kommentar till en kommentar till en kommentar om 
internprissättnings-dokumentation, Svensk Skattetidning, vol. 5, 2007, pp. 320-323.  
[cit: Hall & Persson 2007, En kommentar], pp. 320-323. 
168 Sects. 2-4 in Action 13, Final Report 2015, pp. 11-12. 
169 See Annex I & II to Chapter V in Action 13, Final Report 2015, pp. 25-28. 
170 Action 13, Final Report 2015, p. 10. 
171 Sect. 18 in Action 13, Final Report 2015, pp. 14-15. 
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4.2 Analysis of Swedish transfer pricing 
documentation requirements 
In October 2013, the Ministry of Finance requested that the SKV investigate 
the effectiveness of the Swedish transfer pricing regulations and analyze the 
possibility of simplifications. The initiative behind the SKV’s assignment was 
strongly associated with the Ministry of Enterprise (Näringsdepartementet); 
since enterprises complained that the transfer pricing rules were complicated 
and costly. The SKV’s assignment specifically consisted of three parts: an 
international comparison, a deep analysis of the Swedish transfer pricing 
rules, and a proposal for how to simplify the regulations.172 This led to the 
SKV’s report, Utvärdering av reglerna om dokumentationsskyldighet vid 
internprissättning, which contains an external survey with enterprises and 
interviews with accountant firms, the Swedish Industry and the SKV.173 
Given the time constraints of this thesis, such an extensive interview process 
would not have been plausible and therefore the author utilizes the surveys 
and interviews from the SKV’s report. 
 
Since Swedish enterprises do not declare their intra-group cross-border 
transactions in their tax returns, the SKV does not have specific data about 
how many enterprises or which enterprises apply the transfer pricing rules.174 
Therefore, the SKV selected the enterprises to participate in the survey 
accordingly. First, the SKV extracted a collection of enterprises that 
potentially have international transactions. Then these enterprises were 
divided into four categories: small to medium Swedish enterprises, small to 
medium foreign enterprises, large Swedish enterprises, and large foreign 
enterprises. After that a manual review of the enterprises annual report 
revealed if the selected enterprises actually had international transactions.175  
 
The following results from the SKV’s report solely highlight the responses 
from the large Swedish and foreign enterprises, since the OECD recommends 
that only (large) enterprises with a turnover exceeding EUR 750 million176 
complete CbC reporting.177 Unsurprisingly, the majority of enterprises agree 
that the implementation of Swedish TPD requirements did not alter the 
enterprise’s application of the arm’s length principle. The following five 
                                                 
172 Uppdrag till Skatteverket att utvärdera reglerna om dokumentationsskyldighet vid 
internprissättning, Fi2013/3755, Finansdepartementet, 2013-10-17.  
173 See Chap. 4 of Skatteverkets rapport 2014-10-13. I would like to especially thank, Senior 
tax officer, Pom Heimdahl, at the Swedish Tax Agency for her gratitude and support during 
the initial part of the author’s research process. She coordinated a meeting on September 9, 
2015 with Jesper Persson and Jan-Eric Wellershaus at the Malmö office. During that meeting 
the author posed questions about the Skatteverkets rapport 2014-10-13 in addition to general 
information about transfer pricing.  
174 See Sect. 12 of the SKVFS 2007:1.   
175 Skatteverkets rapport 2014-10-13, pp. 25-27. 
176 See Sect. 52 in Action 13, Final Report 2015, p. 21. It is crucial to bear in mind that this 
threshold is the OECD’s recommendation and will not necessarily be adopted into domestic 
law.  
177 All the results of the SKV’s survey can be found in Annex 5 of Skatteverkets rapport 
2014-10-13, pp. 72-76. 
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questions in the survey focus on the time spent and the cost of completing 
satisfactory TPD.178 Question nine in the survey asks, ‘Do you consider that 
the SKV has supplied sufficient information about how to interpret and apply 
the transfer pricing rules?’179 The respondents answered, no, yes, or non-
applicable as illustrated in Table 1180.  
 
TABLE 1. SUFFICIENT INFORMATION 
Category No Yes N/A 
Enterprises part of a large 
Swedish enterprise 
32% 32% 37% 
Enterprises part of a large 
foreign enterprise 
24% 48% 29% 
 
Before proceeding, the reader should note that the following interpretations 
of this data reflect the author’s observations. The even distribution in response 
from the enterprises belonging to a large Swedish enterprise suggests that 
they feel indifferent about the sufficiency of the SKV’s information. 
Surprisingly, the majority of the enterprises within a large foreign enterprise 
answered that the SKV’s information suffices for the application of the 
transfer pricing rules. This can be explained by the Swedish transfer pricing 
rules coherence with the TP Guidelines and that Sweden does not have any 
additional country requirements.  
 
The next question in the survey asks, ‘How do you think the TPD rules 
work?’181 The respondents chose between: well, poor, and non-applicable. 
Table 2182 shows the results. 
 
TABLE 2. DOCUMENTATION REGULATIONS 
Category Well Poor N/A 
Enterprises part of a large 
Swedish enterprise 
53% 21% 26% 
Enterprises part of a large 
foreign enterprise 
38% 14% 48% 
 
The majority of the respondents belonging to a large Swedish enterprise 
answered ‘well’, which implies that the industry feels relatively satisfied with 
the Swedish TPD rules. Only 38% of the companies within a large foreign 
enterprise answered ‘well’, although the majority responded non-applicable. 
This infers that TPD does not affect the majority of enterprises part of a large 
foreign enterprise. Unfortunately, the questionnaire did not include questions 
that were more associated to BEPS and the new TPD recommendations. At 
the same time, the SKV specifically received a mandate to evaluate how the 
                                                 
178 Skatteverkets rapport 2014-10-13, pp. 72-75. 
179 Skatteverkets rapport 2014-10-13, p. 75 
180 Skatteverkets rapport 2014-10-13, p. 75. 
181 Skatteverkets rapport 2014-10-13, p. 76. 
182 Skatteverkets rapport 2014-10-13, p. 76. 
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administrative costs for enterprises correlate to the transfer pricing 
regulations purpose.183  
 
The SKV also conducted interviews with accountancy firms184, the Swedish 
Industry, and internally at the SKV. The interviews with the accountancy 
firms were based on the external survey that the enterprises responded to. The 
advisors replied that the Swedish regulations do not contain detailed 
characteristics or require special formats and this keeps the administrative 
burden of compiling TPD at bay. They concluded that the Swedish transfer 
pricing regulations are sufficient. In addition, the SKV conducted one 
interview with a representative from the Swedish Industry. The representative 
acknowledged that the Swedish transfer pricing rules reflect the OECD’s 
recommendation and therefore, they do not exacerbate enterprises 
compliance burden. Furthermore, the representative insinuated that large 
companies need to have a global strategy, which is why BEPS is so 
important.185 Thus, it appears that both accountancy firms and the Swedish 
industry value that Sweden follows the TP Guidelines.  
 
Lastly, the SKV carried out interviews within the SKV186 that focused on the 
SKV’s tax control function. Due to regulations in other countries, the SKV 
observed that a large number of enterprises completed TPD prior to 2007. 
After 2007, the SKV recognized some differences in TPD’s quality. For 
instance, more enterprises have hired external support and utilize 
conventional outlines to complete TPD. Even though most enterprises seemed 
to have TPD, most of the documentation had not been updated since 2007. 
The SKV concluded that TPD appears more standardized and deduced that 
enterprises appear to have sufficient routines for compiling TPD upon the 
SKV’s request.187  
 
The implementation of TPD regulations has induced several positive effects, 
but has also increased costs for enterprises. The SKV observes that SKVFS 
2007:1 increases enterprises transfer pricing awareness and that TPD 
contributes to more correct transfer prices. In addition, TPD eases the SKV’s 
audit process by facilitating the SKV’s understanding of the enterprise’s intra-
group cross-border transactions. TPD also depicts a good first impression 
over the enterprise’s transfer prices. However, TPD often contains irrelevant 
information; therefore, the SKV stresses the importance of applying the facts 
to the business at hand. The costs for compiling TPD vary between 
enterprises, but the majority of costs attribute to calculating the transfer price 
rather than compiling TPD. Enterprises and accountant firms generally 
combine the costs of determining the transfer price and completing 
documentation. Therefore, the SKV could not estimate enterprise’s actual 
costs for compiling TPD.188  
                                                 
183 Author’s interpretations. 
184 PwC, KPMG, EY, Deloitte, Grant Thornton, and BDO. 
185 Skatteverkets rapport 2014-10-13, pp. 28-31. 
186 Transfer Pricing Department in Malmö, Göteborg, Stockholm. 
187 Skatteverkets rapport 2014-10-13, pp. 31-33. 
188 Skatteverkets rapport 2014-10-13, pp. 13, 33-36. 
 46 
One of the challenges the SKV faces pertains to their access to relevant 
information from the enterprise under review. The SKV considers various 
options for enforcing TPD compliance, such as: penalties, sanctions, or a 
reversed burden of proof.189 Coincidentally, the updated Chapter V of the TP 
Guidelines advocates utilizing penalties to reinforce compliance. As a method 
of positive reinforcement, the updated Chapter V also commends using 
compliance incentives, such as penalty protection or a shift in the burden of 
proof. At the same time, the OECD recognizes that imposing penalties falls 
within the scope of national law.190 In reference to the Swedish legal system, 
the SKV believes that a reward system for timely TPD submission would be 
meaningless, since taxpayers only submit TPD upon the SKV’s request. 
Instead, the SKV proposes lowering their burden of proof threshold as an 
incentive for enterprises to compose more comprehensive TPD.191 Sub-
section 3.3.1 of this thesis has already specified that the updated Chapter V 
intends to fix tax administrations difficulties in obtaining relevant 
information. If this is the case, then the SKV should have an easier time 
fulfilling their burden of proof, which would make lowering their burden of 
proof threshold unnecessary.192  
   
Before continuing with a deeper analysis about an implementation of Action 
13, the issue of “permanent establishments” deserves some comments. In 
Prop 2005/06:169, the Ministry of Finance excludes Swedish permanent 
establishments from TPD requirements. At the time, the OECD contemplated 
over developing international principles regarding the allocation of profits to 
permanent establishments. Consequently, the Ministry of Finance decided to 
wait and observe the international development of permanent establishments 
before adopting legislation.193 Then in 2008, the OECD published a report 
that encourages the analogous application of Chapter V of the TP Guidelines 
to permanent establishments. In the report, the OECD emphasizes that TPD 
for permanent establishments reinforces the usage of the arm’s length 
principle.194 Sweden still does not have documentation requirements for 
permanent establishments, which the SKV now consider appropriate to 
implement into legislation.195 Recently, the OECD has readdressed 
permanent establishments in Action 7 – Preventing the artificial avoidance of 
permanent establishment status (Action 7). Action 7 recognizes that profit 
allocations to permanent establishments require further work, especially in 
connection to Actions 8-10.196 However, it may be worth considering to what 
                                                 
189 Skatteverkets rapport 2014-10-13, p. 37. 
190 See Sects. 40-43 in Action 13, Final Report 2015, p. 19.  
191 Skatteverkets rapport 2014-10-13, p. 37. 
192 Author’s conclusion.  
193 Prop. 2005/06:169 p. 110. 
194 See Sects. 260-262 in OECD, Report on the attribution of profits to permanent 
establishments, 17 July 2008, http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/41031455.pdf, 
(Accessed: 2015-09-29).  
[cit: Report on the attribution of profits to permanent establishments], p. 162. 
195 Skatteverkets rapport 2014-10-13, pp. 12, 37-38. 
196 Sects. 19-20 in OECD, Preventing the artificial avoidance of permanent establishment 
status, Action 7 – 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, 
OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241220-en, (Accessed: 2015-10-
12). [cit: Action 7, Final Report 2015], p. 45. 
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extent the updated Chapter V will eventually apply to Swedish permanent 
establishments. 
4.3 Swedish implementation of Action 13 
This section examines how the recommendations in the updated Chapter V of 
the TP Guidelines can be formally implemented into the Swedish legal system 
or at least influence how legislation is interpreted.  When countries enter into 
double tax conventions, it is at their disposal to decide how the convention 
applies in domestic law. Monistic countries apply international law directly 
as if it belongs to their legal system. In contrast, dualistic countries perceive 
international law and domestic law as separate legal systems and therefore, 
international law needs to be formally implemented into the domestic legal 
system. Sweden has a dualistic legal system, which entails that international 
agreements become applicable after they have been incorporated into the 
legal system through legislation.197 According to Sect. 3 of Chap. 10 of the 
RF, if an international agreement indicts legislative amendments or if it 
otherwise falls within the Riksdag’s authority, then the Riksdag must accept 
the agreement prior to the Government’s approval.  
 
Even though the TP Guidelines represent internationally accepted statements, 
the recommendations do not equate to Swedish legislation per se. In other 
words, the OECD’s recommendations are nothing more than just 
recommendations. In consideration to Sweden’s dualistic legal tradition, the 
TP Guidelines must be implemented into the Swedish legal system in order 
to receive legal value or precedence. As mentioned in section 2.4, the Shell-
case and Prop. 2005/06:169198 declare that taxpayers and the SKV can utilize 
the TP Guidelines as guidance. Consequently, certain provisions in the TP 
Guidelines about the application and interpretation of the arm’s length 
principle have an immediate impact on taxpayers. While other aspects, such 
as the submission of TPD, require formal legislation. Sweden already has 
legislation199 that requires TPD, but the current stipulations do not cohere 
with the recommendations in the Final Report.  
 
The remaining part of this section contains four sub-sections each of which 
discuss different ways the updated Chapter V can become part of the Swedish 
legal system. A large part of this section builds upon Professors Hultqvist and 
Wiman’s article, BEPS- Implementering i svensk skatterätt, which 
specifically addresses what BEPS elucidates over the Swedish legal system. 
They analyze the implementation of BEPS from a constitutional and 
international perspective and thereby, distinguish between documents that 
have an international binding status from formally binding norms.200 The 
                                                 
197 Pelin, Lars: Internationell skatterätt: i ett svenskt perspektiv, 5. ed., Studentlitteratur, 
Lund, 2011. [cit: Pelin 2011], pp. 89-90. Professor Mattias Dahlberg has also written about 
the difference between monistic and dualistic legal systems. See: Dahlberg, Mattias: 
Internationell beskattning, 4, ed., Studentlitteratur, Lund, 2014. [cit: Dahlberg 2014], p. 249. 
198 Prop. 2005/06:169, p. 89. 
199 Sects. 15-16 of Chap. 39 of the SFL. Sect. 9 of Chap. 9 of the SFF. 
200 Hultqvist & Wiman 2015, pp. 309-311. 
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following sub-sections explore these aspects while simultaneously drawing 
parallels to the updated Chapter V of the TP Guidelines. 
4.3.1 Legislation 
Professors Hultqvist and Wiman believe that the most effective method of 
integrating the BEPS project into Sweden is through the Riksdag’s 
implementation of new or altered legislation. Constitutionally, the Riksdag 
cannot delegate the right to stipulate tax legislation.201 As a result, neither the 
Government nor the SKV can bind the Riksdag into tax norms via 
international agreements and such international agreements are not 
automatically established law. This means that the SKV and the courts do not 
have the authority to apply international principles, such as BEPS Actions 
Plans, that fall outside the interpretative scope of legislation. Consequently, 
according to Professors Hultqvist and Wiman, the Swedish implications of 
BEPS depends on the Riksdag’s acceptance of the OECD’s 
recommendations.202  
 
On the other hand, if the amendments in the TP Guidelines can be interpreted 
within the context of Sects. 19-20 of Chap. 14 of the IL and within the scope 
of Sweden’s general tax legislations, then the TP Guidelines can receive an 
immediate effect.203 For example, according to the SKV, Actions 8-10 are 
directly applicable, since these actions signify a clarification of the arm’s 
length principle.204 Rather than addressing Action 13, Professors Hultqvist 
and Wiman generally analyze the implications of the updated TP Guidelines. 
Although, Professor Hultqvist postulates in an earlier article that the 
ambiguity in the current Swedish TPD requirements do not comply with the 
new TPD standards.205 Already prior to the BEPS project, Professors 
Hultqvist and Wiman find that certain aspects of the 2010 TP Guidelines go 
outside the scope of Swedish legislation. In conclusion, Professors Hultqivst 
and Wiman recognize a dissymmetry between the updated TP Guidelines and 
Swedish legislation. Thus, if Sweden wants to follow the OECD’s new 
guidance completely, then Professors Hultqvist and Wiman find legislative 
amendments necessary.206  
 
It is also worth noting that prior to the 2007 implementation of TPD 
requirements, Prop. 2005/06:169 expresses several concerns about protecting 
the Swedish tax base. For example, the Ministry of Finance perceives a risk 
that the Swedish tax base would not be protected against other countries that 
had already implemented formal TPD.207 Now Sweden stands in a similar 
situation. Other countries have been and are implementing three-tiered TPD 
based on the Final Report. At the same time, the OECD differentiates between 
                                                 
201 Sect. 3 of Chap. 8 of the RF. See sub-section 2.4.2. 
202 Hultqvist & Wiman 2015, pp. 312-313. 
203 Hultqivst & Wiman 2015, p. 321. 
204 Seminarium om BEPS 2015, Powerpoint, pp. 18-19.  
205 Hultqvist 2014, p. 806. 
206 Hultqvist & Wiman 2015, p. 322.  
207 Prop. 2005/06:169 p. 102. 
 49 
revisions that have an immediate effect from those that need to be 
implemented via tax treaties or through domestic laws. The OECD recognizes 
that CbC reporting can require amendments in domestic law and 
consequently, countries adoption of CbC reporting will occur at different 
rates. In order to not undermine the effectivity of CbC reporting, the OECD 
signifies CbC reporting as a minimum standard. This infers that the first 
countries to implement CbC reporting will not be adversely effected by other 
countries.208 As a result, regardless of how slow or how fast Sweden 
implements CbC reporting into legislation, it will not prevent other countries 
from requesting or obtaining the CbC report. This phenomenon will be 
illustrated more explicitly in the case study in section 5.1. The next sub-
section examines if the SKV has the authority to obtain three-tiered TPD that 
the updated Chapter V recommends.   
4.3.2 Swedish Tax Agency’s authority 
In the same report that section 4.2 discusses, the SKV takes a stance to BEPS 
and the SKV’s authority to implement new regulations or publish new 
guidance. The SKV evaluates the Swedish regulations in regards to the 
updated Chapter V of the TP Guidelines. First, the SKV recognizes that the 
updated Chapter V contains detailed information about the contents of TPD 
in addition to CbC reporting. Since the Swedish stipulations do not contain 
any equivalent requirements for a master file, a local file or a CbC report, the 
SKV concludes that they lack the authority to request the type of information 
the OECD recommends. The SKV also addresses the preparatory works to 
see if there exists a broader scope of interpretation, but reach the same 
conclusions. As a result, the SKV lacks the authority to implement new 
regulations that coincide with the OECD’s recommendations, which means 
that amendments in the statutory law deem necessary.209  
 
In addition, the SKV encourages legislators to reconsider risk analysis, 
selection criteria, as well as material thresholds when forming new TPD rules. 
The updated Chapter V permits tax administrations to perform transfer 
pricing risk assessments beforehand; thereby, facilitating more effective audit 
selections. In order to emphasize the most important information, the new 
provisions also encourage local countries to develop their own material 
standards.210  Current legislation does not require Swedish taxpayers to 
disclose information about transfer pricing in their tax return and the SKV 
lacks the authority to request an enterprise’s TPD before an audit. Therefore, 
the SKV does not have the capacity to perform the type of risk analysis and 
selection the updated Chapter V recommends.211 Although, Prop. 
2005/06:169 leaves the option open for a future implementation of obligatory 
                                                 
208 Explanatory statement, pp. 6-9. The Explanatory Statement states that, “Recognising the 
need to level the playing field, all OECD and G20 countries commit to consistent 
implementation in the areas of … Country-by-Country Reporting.” See Sect. 11 in 
Explanatory statement, p. 6. 
209 Skatteverkets rapport 2014-10-13, pp. 19-23. 
210 See for example Sects. 32-34 in Action 13, Final Report 2015, p. 17. 
211 Skatteverkets rapport 2014-10-13, p. 24. 
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transfer pricing information in tax declarations.212 When considering material 
thresholds, the SKV notices that simplified TPD often equates to the regular 
TPD. The simplification purpose is often undermined, due to confusion about 
the contents of simplified TPD for low value transactions. If Sweden wants 
to follow the OECD’s recommendations, then the SKV proposes that 
legislative amendments occur in these areas as well.213  
 
In the SKV’s final proposal, the agency suggests that harmonizing the 
Swedish regulations with the TP Guidelines, increases foreseeability among 
enterprises and minimizes adjustments to local regulations. Hypothetically, 
internationally harmonized TPD decreases MNE’s compliance burden, since 
MNEs can follow one format. Presently, the Swedish TPD regulations reflect 
the 2010 TP Guidelines; therefore, it only seems natural that the Swedish 
regulations continue to coincide with the TP Guidelines.214 On December 1, 
2015, the SKV officially announced that the Ministry of Finance has called 
upon the SKV to compose draft legislation that implements Action 13. The 
SKV predicts that January 1, 2017, is the earliest new legislation will be 
implemented.215 
4.3.3 European Union 
Professors Hultqvist and Wiman identify legislation via the EU as another 
plausible alternative by which the updated TP Guidelines can influence 
Sweden. Contrary to the OECD, the EU has the opportunity to stipulate and 
enforce legislation.216 EU regulations are directly applicable within Swedish 
law, while EU directives require implementation.217 As discussed in section 
2.3, the EU and OECD fulfil different purposes. The European Commission 
emphasizes that the EU embodies unique elements, including the Single 
Market, single currency, and fundamental freedoms; and therefore, reforms 
need to align to the dynamics of the EU. In order to protect the Single Market, 
the European Commission has recently re-launched CCCTB through a 
Communication218 to the European Parliament and Council. From the 
European Commission’s perspective, CCCTB provides a holistic solution, 
eliminates profit-shifting incentives within the EU, and retains transparency 
between jurisdictions. Contrary to the OECD, the European Commission 
perceives the current transfer pricing system as ineffective, but supports 
                                                 
212 Prop. 2005/06:169 pp. 112-113. 
213 Skatteverkets rapport 2014-10-13, pp. 23-24, 35-36. 
214 Skatteverkets rapport 2014-10-13, pp. 39-40. 
215 Seminarium om BEPS 2015, Powerpoint, pp. 31-38. Seminarium om BEPS 2015, 
Webcast, Del 2. 
216 Hultqvist & Wiman 2015, p. 316. 
217 Article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states that, 
“A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly 
applicable in all Member States. A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, 
upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities 
the choice of form and methods.” 
218 Communication from the commission to the European Parliament and the Council – A 
fair and efficient tax system in the European Union: 5 key areas for action, 17 june 2015, 
COM(2015) 302 final. [cit: COM(2015) 302 final]. 
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increasing transparency.219 For example, the European Commission 
continues to evaluate the appropriateness of extending CbC reporting to 
MNEs in other sectors.220  
 
Tax Consultants, Isabel Verlinden and Pieter Deré, express concerns over the 
effect that a CCCTB will have on tax treaties between Member States and 
between Member States and third countries. Since most tax treaties refer to 
the arm’s length principle, conflicts of interest may arise if the CCCTB results 
in a profit allocation that differs from the arm’s length principle. 
Consequently, countries would have to amend their tax treaties in order to 
permit the superiority of using allocation keys under the CCCTB in certain 
situations.221 The European Commission reassures us of their support for the 
BEPS project, but reinforces the need for an EU conform approach to improve 
the business environment. Indeed, the CCCTB reflects a pro-business 
initiative, since consolidation allows MNEs to offset profits and losses 
between Member States. Ultimately, the European Commission seeks to 
guarantee that profits generated in the EU are taxed in the EU.222 Verlinden 
and Deré advise the EU to link their own measures under the OECD BEPS 
initiatives and fear that a CCCTB conflicts with the existing tax treaty 
network.223  
4.3.4 Soft law 
The last and possibly the most unavoidable way the updated TP Guidelines 
will affect Sweden is through the dynamics of soft law. Since the right to tax 
derives from legislation, it is crucial to differentiate between legal 
enforcement and behavioral impact. Professor of Law, Jose Calderón, at La 
Coruna University distinctly qualifies the TP Guidelines as an instrument of 
soft law. Even though Professor Calderón’s article comes from 2007, the 
progression of TPD requirements and the high-attention transfer pricing has 
received on an international and national level reinforce the application of the 
TP Guidelines. Thus, Professor Calderón’s conclusions demonstrate the 
behavioral impact the TP Guidelines have on the implementation of 
legislation and enterprises aptitude to follow the arm’s length principle.224  
 
Professors Hultqvist and Wiman criticize international guidelines, since they 
are a way to circumvent tax treaties and national legislation. They describe 
                                                 
219 COM(2015)302 final, pp. 6-13. 
220 See Commission launches public consultation on corporate tax transparency, European 
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international guidelines as an enforcement fast track that avoid the proper 
constitutional methods of law enforcement while still maintaining high 
precedence. If the international guidelines provide clear and precise 
interpretations of the regulations, then they receive a stronger influence. 
Furthermore, countries utilize the OECD’s international standards on such a 
broad scale that these standards have become accepted international 
principles, i.e. soft law. The problem with this soft law approach lies in the 
uncertainty over application and the lack of concreteness. Since taxation 
remains a national sovereignty, countries choose their own tax rates, 
implementation schemes, and models of enforcement. Conflicts and disputes 
unfold when countries implement international guidelines at different rates 
with domestic modifications.225  
4.4 Summary 
In summary, the initial adoption of Swedish TPD requirements has received 
significant response from legal doctrine. The primary reactions express 
concerns about what constitutes relevant information, the principle of 
proportionality, and the extensiveness of being prepared for the SKV’s TPD 
request. Coincidentally, the Final Report clarifies what constitutes relevant 
information and seeks to balance taxpayers’ compliance costs with the tax 
authorities need for the information. The SKV’s survey depicts a general 
satisfaction with Sweden’s TPDs requirements and even the SKV conceives 
that they carry out effective controls over transfer prices. However, the SKV 
proposes lowering their burden of proof as an incentive for taxpayers to write 
more comprehensive TPD. Even though the OECD analogously applies 
Chapter V of the TP Guidelines to permanent establishments, Sweden still 
does not require permanent establishments to compile TPD. 
 
Ultimately, the Swedish implementation of Action 13 is most fathomable 
through the Riksdag’s legislation, since the SKV lacks the authority to 
implement such invasive amendments as three-tiered TPD. In addition, other 
issues, such as transfer pricing risk assessments, deserve the Riksdag’s 
reconsideration. It also remains possible that the EU will implement 
legislation or provide further guidance about transfer pricing. What remains 
unclear is whether the EU will adopt another approach, i.e. CCCTB, that 
strides against the arm’s length principle. Lastly, soft law influences the 
practicality of transfer pricing and consequently, Swedish MNEs will need to 
adjust to the adoption of new transfer pricing rules in other jurisdictions. 
 
                                                 
225 Hultqvist & Wiman 2015, pp. 310-315. 
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5 Analysis 
The analysis is comprised of three sections and provides a practical as well as 
theoretical perspective of TPD. In order to exemplify the impact of three-
tiered TPD on Swedish MNEs, the first section portrays a hypothetical case 
study. This leads to a more theoretical analysis in the second section that 
focuses on four central themes – proportionality, relevant information, 
confidentiality, and compliance. Finally, the last section summarizes the 
findings of this thesis and proposes further areas of research.  
5.1 Case study 
Even though Sweden has not implemented the updated Chapter V formally 
into legislation, Swedish MNEs will already face the repercussions of the 
OECD’s new guidance during 2016. The following case study illustrates this 
phenomenon. 
 
FIGURE 3226. PARADISE CRUISES GROUP 
 
The Swedish company, Paradise AB, is the ultimate parent company of the 
Paradise Cruises group. Paradise Cruises offers unique, exclusive wedding 
cruises. The Paradise Cruises group operates worldwide, but the focus of this 
case study will be on the European operations. Within the EU, Paradise AB 
has subsidiaries in Denmark and in the UK. The parent company of the 
Danish group, Smag A/S, organizes the catering on the cruise ships. The 
parent company of the UK group, Fix Ltd, takes care of the repairs and 
ensures that the cruise ships are operating in full capacity. In addition, the 
consolidated turnover of the Paradise group exceeds EUR 750 million.  
 
  
                                                 
226 Kindly note that this case study is the author’s own construction and not based on any 
particular MNE group.  
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Paradise AB is registered in Sweden and according to Swedish legislation; 
Paradise AB is not required to submit a master file, a local file, or a CbC 
report to the SKV. However, both Denmark227 and the UK228 have already 
issued draft legislations, which require three-tiered TPD. For the purpose of 
this case study, the author bases the assumptions on the relevant draft 
legislations. The draft legislation in Denmark enforces three-tiered TPD; 
consequently, the Paradise group will need to prepare a high-level master file 
about its wedding cruises. Smag A/S will also need to prepare a local file that 
specifies the relevant intra-group transactions for transfer pricing purposes. 
To clarify, transactions between Smag A/S and the Danish subsidiaries are 
not relevant for transfer pricing purposes, since these transactions occur 
between two Danish entities. Regardless of when Sweden implements three-
tiered TPD, Smag A/S will continue to be responsible for the submission of a 
master file and a local file.   
 
Since Paradise AB does not submit CbC reporting in Sweden and no 
automatic exchange of CbC reports exist between Denmark and Sweden, then 
Denmark can apply the secondary reporting mechanisms229. Smag A/S will 
be required to submit CbC reporting locally in Denmark. Smag A/S also has 
the opportunity to file the CbC report locally in Denmark on behalf of all the 
Danish entities. If the Paradise group designates a “Surrogate Parent 
Company,” in another jurisdiction - that requires CbC reporting, has 
information exchange agreements with Denmark, no systematic failure, and 
both the tax authorities in the surrogate parent company’s jurisdiction and in 
Denmark have received notification -  then Smag A/S would not be required 
to locally file CbC reporting. In contrast to Denmark, the draft regulations in 
the UK propose voluntary local filing.230 This means that Fix Ltd could (but 
does not have to) file a CbC report in the UK on behalf of the Paradise group. 
In turn, the UK would have the authority to exchange the Paradise group’s 
CbC reporting with other tax authorities, which potentially avoids multiple 
local filing. In an essence, the country with the strictest rules sets the ceiling 
for compliance. When Sweden implements CbC reporting, then the SKV will 
bear the responsibility of exchanging CbC reports with other tax authorities.  
                                                 
227 L 46 – forslag til lov om ændring af skattekontrolloven, arbejdsmarkedsbidragsloven, 
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5.2 Global transfer pricing documentation 
Regardless of when Sweden implements the updated Chapter V of the TP 
Guidelines, Swedish MNEs are already experiencing the impacts of three-
tiered TPD internationally, which the case study has illustrated. Even though 
tax remains a national sovereignty, businesses operate globally and have to 
comply with local jurisdictions. To a certain extent, it only seems fair that 
countries have the freedom to implement those international tax policies that 
‘best-fit’ their national scheme. On the other hand, coordination and 
harmonization ease MNEs compliance burden when it comes to transfer 
pricing. Now the OECD attempts to harmonize TPD between countries; but 
is standardized documentation, i.e. ‘a one size fits all’ approach, in Sweden’s 
best interest? 
 
Four overarching themes – proportionality, relevant information, 
confidentiality, and compliance - have reoccurred throughout this thesis. 
These themes overlap each other and will be analyzed in correlation to the 
Swedish legal system in light of the updated Chapter V of the TP Guidelines. 
Before looking at these themes, it is crucial to revisit the purpose and 
objective of TPD. The Final Report provides three objectives of TPD: 
taxpayers’ assessment of their compliance with the arm’s length principle, tax 
administrations risk identification and assessment, and lastly, providing tax 
administrations with useful information for a transfer pricing audit. In 
Sweden, Prop. 2005/06:169 states that TPD facilitates tax control, increases 
taxpayers’ foreseeability, and creates uniformity. Especially since Sweden is 
not obliged to follow the OECD’s recommendations, it is with these 
objectives in mind that Sweden should reconsider legislative amendments.   
 
In the Swedish legal system, Sect. 2 of the SKVFS 2007:1 expresses the 
principle of proportionality. Indeed, TPD only needs to contain the necessary 
information for the SKV’s transfer pricing assessment. Similarly, the Final 
Report elaborates on balancing taxpayers’ compliance costs with tax 
administrations usefulness of the information. In the case, that Sweden 
implements the master file and local file outlines as described in Annex I and 
II of the Final Report, then businesses will have greater foreseeability about 
the expected content and format of TPD. In addition, the OECD proposes that 
clear and widely adopted TPD rules decrease businesses compliance costs. 
Yet, the OECD’s postulation depends on multi-lateral uniformity and 
uniformed TPD might not be plausible within a global text. The OECD 
neglects to remember that in the majority of countries, the TP Guidelines hold 
soft-law status. Consequently, countries may be committed from a political 
standpoint, but not from a legal one. For example, the stagnant adoption of 
EUTPD within the EU exemplifies the difficulties with coordinating TPD 
formats; therefore, this author questions whether uniformed documentation 
will ultimately alleviate taxpayers’ compliance costs. 
 
Another aspect of proportionality within the Swedish legal system relates to 
the compilation and submission of TPD upon the SKV’s request, which Sects. 
11-12 of the SKVFS 2007:1 stipulate. This aspect of flexibility decreases 
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MNEs compliance burden, since it deems sufficient to have routines in place 
for compiling TPD. Section 4.1 has illustrated that there exists differing views 
about the extent of preparation that is necessary to comply with the SKV’s 
request. The SKV’s report reveals that Swedish MNEs generally have the 
routines necessary to fulfil the SKV’s request. In addition, the SKV observes 
that TPD prompts MNEs to reconsider their compliance with the arm’s length 
principle when entering into transactions.231 The SKV’s observations 
correspond with the Final Report’s first objective of TPD requirements – the 
taxpayer’s assessment of their compliance with the arm’s length principle. 
Therefore, this author determines that submitting TPD upon the SKV’s 
request suffices in the Swedish legal system. However, MNEs also need to 
comply with the transfer pricing rules in other jurisdictions, which the case 
study has demonstrated. As a best practice, the OECD recommends applying 
the deadline for filing tax returns to the finalization of the master file and local 
file. For the Paradise Cruises group, this entails that Paradise AB should 
complete the master file by the time of their tax returns. Even though Paradise 
AB is not required to submit a master file to the SKV, Denmark and the UK 
require a master file and a local file. Since the information exchange 
agreements232 only pertain to the CbC report, both Smag A/S and Fix Ltd will 
need to submit the Paradise group’s master file to the Danish tax authorities 
and HM Revenue & Customs respectively.  
 
As a means for easing taxpayers’ compliance burden, the Final Report also 
establishes material thresholds. For example, the Final Report recommends 
that countries only require MNEs with a turnover exceeding EUR 750 million 
to complete CbC reporting. Supplement B shows that countries generally 
follow the OECD’s recommended reporting threshold. Yet, currency 
differences can fluctuate over time, which may create some practical 
problems with CbC reporting. Local countries also have the opportunity to 
determine material thresholds, if any, for local file purposes. Hence, material 
thresholds can set boundaries on the type and number of transactions to 
include in TPD, especially in the local file.233 It is crucial to remember that 
transfer pricing involves associated enterprises from two different 
jurisdictions. As a result, differences in material thresholds can occur between 
jurisdictions. For example, Land X might require that TPD contains all intra-
group cross-border transactions, whereas Land Y only requires the three 
largest transactions. More importantly, local files need to be written from the 
perspective of the relevant entity; thus, an intra-group transaction might be 
relevant from a Danish perspective, but not from a British one. Still, material 
thresholds can potentially ease taxpayers’ compliance burden and minimize 
the number of transactions the tax administrations need to control.  
 
As a final point, the OECD connotes that three-tiered TPD provides tax 
administrations with more useful information. However, the extent of 
information appears excessive for both taxpayers and tax administrations. 
There lies a risk that the administrative burden will increase for both parties. 
                                                 
231 See section 4.2. 
232 See Annex IV in Action 13, Final Report 2015, pp. 37-69. 
233 See sub-section 3.3.2. 
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In addition, providing a list of items that should be included in TPD does not 
guarantee that tax administrations can utilize the information. Ironically, the 
background to the SKV’s report regards simplifying the Swedish transfer 
pricing rules, since MNEs find them to be complex and difficult to apply. This 
author observes that Action 13 encloses intricate guidance that MNEs will 
need further clarifications on from the SKV.  
 
What constitutes relevant information for the purposes of TPD correlates with 
proportionality. In Sweden, Sect. 9 of Chap. 9 of the SFF requires that TPD 
contains five specific items: a company description, a description of the 
relevant transaction, a functional analysis, a description of the selected 
transfer pricing method, and a comparability analysis. In addition, the SKV 
has the authority to issue additional regulations to clarify the specific content 
of TPD. As a guiding principle, Sect. 2 of the SKVFS 2007:1 articulates that 
the content of TPD shall make a transfer pricing assessment plausible. This 
coincides with the Final Report’s second and third objective of compiling 
TPD, i.e. providing tax administrations with the necessary information for a 
transfer pricing risk assessment and with useful information for conducting a 
transfer pricing audit. According to the OECD, relevant information equates 
to at least the list of items in Annexes I-III of the Final Report, but countries 
have the opportunity to specify their own standards. In order to comply with 
the updated Chapter V, the Swedish legislation could necessitate that TPD 
comprises of a master file, a local file, and a CbC report. Then the SKV could 
further specify through regulations what specific information should be 
included within these three documents.  This would create greater flexibility 
for the SKV and allow the Swedish legal system to evolve in coherence with 
the TP Guidelines. While the OECD considers that the revisions in Chapter 
V of the TP Guidelines are complete, not all of the action plans regarding 
transfer pricing have reached a finalized form. Since the action plans interact 
with each other, future changes within the area of TPD may indirectly occur. 
For example, the OECD has not finalized profit allocation to permanent 
establishments.234   
 
Even though the OECD plans to publish a new version of the TP Guidelines 
in 2017, the amendments in Chapter V are already applicable. It remains 
unclear to what extent the SKV and even taxpayers should interpret the 
updated Chapter V as a clarification of what constitutes relevant information. 
From this author’s perspective, the master file and local file impose a new 
format for submitting TPD. In other words, information that was previously 
in one document will now be in two separate documents. Furthermore, the 
suggested content in Annex I and II of the Final Report can still categorize as 
information that the SKV needs for a transfer pricing assessment. The author 
questions to what extent the SKV can interpret the updated Chapter V within 
the scope of Sect. 16 of Chap. 39 of the SFL and Sect. 9 of Chap. 9 of the 
SFF. Until the Riksdag adopts new legislation, it would be helpful for 
Swedish taxpayers to know the SKV’s position.  
 
                                                 
234 See section 4.2. 
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Indisputably, MNEs hold the most knowledge about their business and 
compile TPD for the tax authorities (not for the public). Since the OECD has 
decided to incorporate CbC reporting as a component of TPD, then the CbC 
report should remain confidential. The author strongly disagrees with 
Professor Brauner’s proposals about publically disclosing CbC reporting. 
Aspects of legitimacy and restoring public trust in big business emulate 
political campaigns rather than aspects of taxation. Rather than dampening 
profit shifting, Professor Blank postulates that public disclosure of CbC 
reporting could increase aggressive tax behavior. Indeed, public disclosure of 
CbC reporting releases commercially sensitive information, which runs the 
risk of being misinterpreted.235 Going back to the case study, if other cruise 
companies could assess how the Paradise Cruises group operates, then this 
may lead to conflicts in competition law. Furthermore, there are other reasons 
than tax for how a MNE decides to setup their operations. In the case study, 
the Paradise Cruises group specifically wants to offer their cliental exquisite 
Nordic food prepared by Danish chefs. Therefore, the location of the Danish 
company Smag A/S depends on the capacity to offer unique Nordic dining 
experiences aboard the cruises. In conclusion, this thesis recommends that 
CbC reporting remain confidential.   
 
The remainder of this analysis examines compliance from three different 
perspectives. The first perspective refers to a taxpayer’s compliance with the 
arm’s length principle and submission of TPD. Tax administrations represent 
the second perspective, since they also have to follow certain standards when 
applying the rules and remain within their domain of authority. Finally, the 
third perspective looks at compliance on a broader scale; notably, Sweden’s 
compliance with the OECD and the EU.  
 
Sweden follows the arm’s length principle in Sect. 19 of Chap. 14 of the IL, 
which entails that the transfer price between two associated enterprises must 
be at arm’s length. The TP Guidelines recommend compiling TPD as a means 
for enterprises to show coherence with the arm’s length principle. As noted 
in section 4.2, the SKV considers that TPD gives a good first impression for 
the assessment of transfer prices. In order to ensure that taxpayers supply tax 
administrations with TPD, the updated Chapter V advocates utilizing 
monetary penalties to make non-compliance more expensive and/or providing 
compliance incentives, such as a shift in the burden of proof. The SKV 
determines that neither TPD penalties nor compliance incentives fit the 
Swedish transfer pricing regime. In addition, Prop. 2005/06:169 clearly states 
that the implementation of TPD would not affect the SKV’s initial burden of 
proof. Now, the SKV proposes lowering their burden of proof as a positive 
incentive for MNEs to construct thorough TPD. Due to the complexity of 
transfer pricing and the challenges of measuring behavioral impact, lowering 
the SKV’s burden of proof may not produce the desired effect. 
 
Another side of compliance resides with tax administrations. Tax 
administrations also bear the responsibility to respect taxpayers’ access to 
                                                 
235 See sub-section 3.2.2. 
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information, be reasonable in their transfer pricing assessments, and utilize 
TPD for the right purpose. The Final Report diligently clarifies how the CbC 
report expedites transfer pricing risk assessments and reiterates that tax 
administrations should not use it for transfer pricing adjustments.236 However, 
there remains a risk that CbC reporting will be abused and applied out of 
context. For instance, the high-level global overview of income may tempt 
tax administrators to apply formulary apportionment or deduce irrational 
conclusions. In addition, information exchange entails that tax 
administrations in different jurisdictions bear obligations against each other. 
Returning to the case study, if Paradise AB voluntarily files the CbC report 
in the UK on behalf of the Paradise Cruises group then HM Revenue & 
Customs is responsible for sharing the CbC report with the Danish tax 
authorities. Failure to do so, entails that Smag A/S will have to locally file the 
CbC report with the Danish tax authorities. 
 
In Sweden, the SKV has to stay within their scope of administrative authority, 
which is why the SKV cannot simply implement Action 13 into Swedish law. 
In comparison to the previous recommendations, the updated Chapter V of 
the TP Guidelines contains more information.237 Since the SKV has received 
criticism for SKVFS 2007:1, the agency appears more cautious about 
extending their scope of interpretation. Although, nothing in the current 
Swedish legislation suggests that the SKV has the authority to request a CbC 
report or exchange it with other jurisdictions. Therefore, it would be unjust 
for the SKV to require taxpayers to submit a master file, a local file, and a 
CbC report.  
 
The TP Guidelines represent soft law and Sweden chooses to follow the 
OECD’s guidance regarding transfer pricing and the arm’s length principle. 
Indeed, Sweden participates in the BEPS project and sends signals that 
Sweden will implement the Final Report. Even if Sweden decides not to 
implement or enforce the updated Chapter V, the OECD does not have the 
authority to penalize Sweden. However, the local implementation in 
surrounding countries, such as Denmark, creates political peer pressure. After 
all, the OECD articulates that combatting BEPS requires multilateral efforts. 
Professors Hultqvist and Wiman also recognize that soft law tends to create 
ambiguity and therefore, they encourage that Sweden implements new 
legislation.  
 
Unlike the OECD, the EU can oblige Sweden to implement legislation. The 
relaunch of CCCTB makes it unclear whether the EU will continue to follow 
the arm’s length principle in the inner market. CCCTB points in another 
direction and gives the implication that the EU signifies a test pilot for the 
possibility of formulary apportionment. The European Commission’s 
proposal also insinuates that the EU seeks to protect tax erosion between the 
EU and third countries. Therefore, it deems difficult to deduce how CCCTB 
complements the OECD’s work on the TP Guidelines.238 The author hopes 
                                                 
236 See sub-section 3.3.1. 
237 Compare sub-section 2.2.1 with 3.3.1-3.3.2 in this thesis.  
238 See sub-section 4.3.3. 
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that the EU refrains from stipulating rules that differ from the OECDs 
guidance and leaves the area of transfer pricing to the OECD. This prevents 
a conflict of rules and interpretations between the OECD and EU, in addition 
to allowing Sweden to implement its own domestic legislation.  
 
In summary, this section has investigated TPD from four different themes: 
proportionality, relevant information, confidentiality and compliance. 
Proportionality focuses on striking a balance between taxpayers’ 
administrative burdens and tax administrations information needs. Especially 
since, excessive information may be detrimental for both parties. Relevant 
information centers on the actual transaction and countries have the 
opportunity to specify which transactions are significant for TPD. Even 
though CbC reporting does not look at specific transactions, the CbC report 
as well as the other components of TPD should remain confidential. Since 
articles generally focus on the taxpayers’ perspective of complying with the 
arm’s length principle, the author has also presented compliance issues from 
a tax administrators and a Swedish perspective.  
5.3 Conclusions 
This thesis has analyzed the development of Action 13 as well as its pending 
implementation in Sweden. The updated Chapter V of the TP Guidelines 
significantly differs from the previous version; therefore, in the majority of 
countries domestic changes are necessary. Based on the SKV’s 
announcement on December 1, 2015, it appears that Sweden will implement 
Action 13 by January 1, 2017. Generally, the new guidance provides more 
information and promotes more harmonized TPD between countries. CbC 
reporting creates large expectations and continuous follow up on CbC 
reporting is needed domestically and internationally. If the updated Chapter 
V will supersede expectations and combat BEPS remains unknown. Future 
studies should focus on the effectiveness of the updated Chapter V and 
whether standardized TPD increases or decreases taxpayers’ compliance 
burden. Even tax administrations should continue to review their satisfaction 
with standardized TPD. Accordingly, studies could analyze the content of 
TPD to evaluate the necessity and usefulness of the information. 
 
The author has identified four central themes – proportionality, relevant 
information, confidentiality, and compliance – that represent the main 
concerns when formulizing transfer pricing rules. Even though Sweden is not 
an early adopter of Action 13, Swedish MNEs need to cohere with the rules 
in their operating jurisdictions. Thus, the majority of Swedish MNEs will 
already be following three-tiered TPD prior to Sweden’s implementation. 
This was also the case when Sweden implemented TPD requirements in 2007. 
On the other hand, the SKV has the opportunity to observe how other 
countries implement the new TPD requirements when the agency formulizes 
draft legislation. More than likely, Sweden will implement the new three-
tiered TPD that the updated Chapter V recommends, but other aspects such 
as penalties or notifications in tax returns remain less obvious. It is crucial for 
Swedish MNEs and the SKV to have an open dialogue in order to make any 
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transitions as smooth as possible. In the end, the author questions the 
plausibility of standardized documentation, i.e. ‘one size fits all’, in a 
globalized world.  
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Supplement A 
FIGURE 4239. TEMPLATE FOR COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORT  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
239 Action 13, Final Report 2015, pp. 29-30. 
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Supplement B 
FIGURE 5240. CbC REPORTING IMPLEMENTATION SPECIFICS  
 
 
                                                 
240 New reporting under Action 13, p. 10. 
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